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REASON, AFFECT, AND VALUE

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HOW TO EDUCATE A MAN

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Educational Theory

Volume IX April, 1959 Number 2

REASON, AFFECT, AND VALUE

BY HOWARD L. PARSONS

WESTERN THINKERS HAVE FREQUENTLY SEPARATED REASON AND AFFECT. Greek logic operated on the presupposition that they ought to be separated,[1] and in Gnostic and Neo-Platonic thought the dualism became fixed and entered into Christian theology. Descartes expressed dualism in his conclusion that "I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and . . . has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing."[2] This view has led to a disjunction between value and reason, too, since value has been thought to be intimately related to affect; or it has led, as in Kant's case, to a highly intellectualized view of value: thought is the source or the content of value, and all else, including affect, is of disvalue. This same separation is implicit in the "emotive" theory of value among modern philosophers; it is also tacitly present in that conception of philosophy which emphasizes the analysis of sentences and forgets about the analysis of issues. For if you analyze issues—the recurrent and basic problems of men—you are bound to move into turbulent waters, where the emotions swirl. The counsel of safety is to stay at home in drydock, with dry philosophy.

I. Affect.

Certain philosophers like Dewey,[3] however, have endeavored to sail the seas where most men live and move and have their being, and have viewed reason and emotion as functions of a unitary, active organism, and as interrelated functions. The present essay is an attempt to develop this line of thought. It is therefore a protest against the traditional disjunction in much of Western philosophy and culture. Its thesis is that our cognitive powers and our different modes of feeling are not in fact separable, and that they *should* be joined in certain ways if man is to realize optimum value.

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[1]Plato and Aristotle are, in certain parts, exceptions. For example, Aristotle says, "the irrational emotions seem to be as truly human as the reason itself and therefore we are as truly responsible for our emotions as for our reasoning." *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book III. Trans. J. E. C. Welldon.

[2]*Discourse on Method*, Part IV.

[3]See especially the essay, "Qualitative Thought," in *Philosophy and Civilization* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1931), pp. 93–116.

For our pupose here,[4] we shall use the generic term "affect" or "quality" to denote all the diversity of indescribable feelings, sensations, and emotions which human beings have experienced or can experience; the immediately given content or "body" or "movement" of experience; the pre-analytic data of perception; the felt vibratory contrasts in our interactions with things and events.[5] "Quality" cannot be defined by analysis, for it is a term assumed in all analysis, and along with "structure" and "event" refers to one of the irreducible elements of our experience. Quality, so far as we know, can be had only as felt quality (or affect); it is what happens when a sensitive organism interacts with events, or, more precisely, when at least one sensitive event or group of events interacts with another event or group of events. We may specify here three kinds of qualities.

"Feeling" shall mean the vague, diffuse affective tone that, once established, belongs to the organism apart from the modifications introduced by the highly developed senses and the higher mental functions. Feeling has a "fringe-quality;" it is unlocalized and more or less "objectless."

By contrast, "sensation" refers to the sharply localized, clear-cut, relatively trivial qualitative images which are directly evoked when the sensory-motor organism reacts to the stimulus-properties of events. As Whitehead has demonstrated, sensation always grows out of feeling, is overlaid upon it, and qualifies and directs it.[6]

"Emotion" here means any quality that ensues when general affective tone or sensation is modified in the quest for value. Emotions are the reactions of a valuing organism to events. Emotion is affective tone as qualified by interest, aim, or valuation.

All quality is a function of the relatedness of events. It is a reflection, sign, or sympton (as physicians know) of the shifting adjustment of the physiological organism in a changing world, whether that change originates within the body or outside it. The experience of sheer feeling, apart from any reference to objectified sense data, or to any emotionalized and objectified values, is the experience of internal tension arising out of the relations of events within the organism; it may be the harmonized unity of mainly bodily contrasts, such as we enjoy in the feeling of *joie de vivre* or the enhancement of sheer animal spirits, or it may be some division felt in the depths of the soul—vague uneasiness, anxiety, or sickness unto death. Again, sensation is the felt contrast in events in the realm of spatial or temporal extension; it is the dynamic tension which we experience directly and kinesthetically. Finally, emotion is the quality of contrast that attends the conflict between felt values, either actual or imagined, or it is the positive quality that attends the resolution of such a conflict.

In a successful act of adjustment, affect and reason work in harmony to bring the act to completion. We may consider four roles played by affect in this harmonization.

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[4]The definitions of affect here, and of its three types, are taken from another article, "Reason and Affect: Some of Their Relations and Functions," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LX, No. 6 (March 13, 1958), pp. 224–225.

[5]This definition of affect is consistent with Spinoza's: an affection (or mode) "by which the power of acting of the body is itself increased, diminished, helped, or hindered . . ." *Ethic*, Part 3, Definition 3. Trans. W. H. White.

[6]*Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), Part II, Chapter VIII, "Symbolic Reference;" and *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927).

(1) As we have seen, quality is the concomitant of organismic activity. It is present in relative quiescence, and it is heightened when the organism is galvanized into give-and-take with objects and events. Quality inheres in both leisure and work, and in both free and blocked action. Because of this fact—the fact that various qualities directly express the physiological states of the organism and *are*, indeed, its psychic states—qualities may be said to *start* and *sustain* the movement of the organism toward activity and toward goals.

Quality functions as a motive to action in two ways. First, there is, underlying every specific impulse and felt quality of the organism, a generic drive. Spinoza called it "the effort by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its own being . . . nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself."[7] This is the drive to be, to become, to fulfill one's capacities for value, to experience qualitative order and, by transformation, to experience a growth in such orders. It is the lure of quality and the transformation of qualities that urges us on. This lure may be greater in some than in others, either because of greater internal tensions or displasias, or because of conditioning. But many psychologists (e.g., Aristotle, Cantril, Horney, Maslow) believe that it is inherent as possibility in all of us. And it is this movement which initiates and sustains the activities of the reason, whether the movement and its associated rational processes are undertaken under external pressures or independent of them.

Secondly, quality as painful or dissatisfying in some way can function as a stimulus to action and hence to reason. A painful quality is directly distressing and provocative of action and perhaps symbolic responses. It is ordinarily a report to use of our states and is sometimes a report about the world and what it has done to us. As such it may set off the work of reason. Moreover, the "drive emotion"[8] that arises in consequence of the blockage of drive may further accelerate the search for relief from frustation and the experience of unwanted quality, and so may initiate the problem-solving work of reason.

(2) Qualities emerge in the conjunction of organism and events. They are the expressions of the relations between man and his world, and as our qualitative manifold acquires structure and grows it becomes neither a map of our minds nor of the world but rather a synthesis of ourselves and the world. For the qualities we have are had by *us* and at the same time are qualities *of* the world independent of our thought and response. Quality, therefore, is the bridge by which the organism crosses over into the world and enters into commerce with it. Qualities, moreover, *sensitize* our awareness of the world, alerting us to a certain portion of it and also to incipient or potential qualities and structures not yet taken in by us. Thus the various sensa are intimations of the interconnections of events, signs that events are at work in a certain way and that the organism is caught up in that working. And similarly, emotion sensitizes the organism to the world, conveying to it the import or significance of sensed qualities or structures. Emotions, in this sense, are *about* the world; they tell of the value, remembered or anticipated, possessed by events for us; they present to us the world as filtered and colored by our attitudes concerning value. Of course, the connections between us and the world indicated by qualities are not always reliable. An intuition of

[7] *Op. cit.*, Part III, Prop. VII.

[8] Stephen C. Pepper, *Principles of Art Appreciation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949), pp. 121–122.

significance may not convey much knowledge of *what* is signified; to value a thing, we need not know much about the thing. Moreover, deep feelings, intense purposes, and inadequate sensory observations may weaken or distort our emotions. Thus while emotion is an avenue to the world, it is sometimes foggy and broad, and requires the surveying instruments of reason, which can chart a straight and narrow path through events.

In sum, by sensitizing the organism to the world, qualities open up the world to the reason. They give it material to work on and form. By fastening the attention on a world they also fasten the mind on subject matter and give it content, and they lead the mind, as it were, to roam and investigate and establish its reign of order.

(3) We are thus led to another way in which affect influences reason, namely, to *release* it.

If we were not sensitive to our destination, to the difficulties standing in our way, to the capacities of our instruments, and to the terrain which must be traversed in order to reach our destination, we should never survey in the first place. Moreover, unless we cherished something actual or possible, we should never bother to think about preserving or attaining it. Our reason in general is exercised in direct proportion to our sensitivity and concern. Hence unless we first feel deeply about some end and are passionately committed to it, we will not amply use our rational powers. We will not talk and act, speculate and experiment, sense and respond to qualities and structures, problems and conflicts, as we would under the compulsion of feeling and commitment. For the mind cannot grow and be transformed unless the body is accordingly *affected*, growing and undergoing qualitative transformation.[9] It is the bliss of the insensitive, unfeeling man that begets his ignorance, in one area or another. If you don't care, you don't think. When the old theologians insisted that faith precedes reason, and when the romantics cried, "Feeling is all!", they were expressing this truth.

Thought arises in trouble and the cue to trouble is a heightened sense of quality and conflict. "Objectivity" cannot mean freeing ourselves completely from the experience of quality; for if it did we should need to eviscerate ourselves, and we should never be objective in trouble. But we are objective in trouble. How so? The qualities that directly bespeak and signalize our trouble sensitize us (as we have seen) and command us to think—to discern, discriminate, and connect the qualities of our awareness, with an aim to understand and control and value. Rather than standing apart from the organism, like an observer in a balloon, reason rescues it from its distress, not because of any inherent heroism in reason but because reason is coerced by the collective interests or "will" of an existential being.

Some philosophers with some justification have separated cognition from quality; for these do have separate functions in behavior, and the remarkable thing about thought and theory is that they can be abstracted from concrete circumstance. But some of these same men have been prey to the ancient intellectual illusion that passion is bad or the modern bourgeois illusion that commitment is unseemly. Not only are these illusions mistaken; they are evil. For the

[9]See Margaret Ribble's study, *The Rights of Infants* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). Thought in infants is stunted as the needs for oxygen, food, and love are not fully met.

implied dualism means that we cannot make the most of our rational powers and that it is impossible to develop a science of values if one is already committed to certain values.

(4) Finally, feeling and emotion may *guide* cognition in a vague but sometimes sure way to its end. This guidance may occur in three ways: (a) by an over-all affective orientation, (b) by the coercion of deeply rooted qualities or qualitative convictions, and (c) by the creative drive of our natures.

(a) The healthy human organism has an emotional, valuative "sense" for the form as well as the quality of his desired outcome, a sense of the way in which it is to be sought, a sense of the utility of this or that means in reaching the end, and a sense of the fitness of what is achieved for what is sought. Such sense or feeling provides a kind of gyroscope or compass in the midst of activity, correcting the forms and applications of reason. Emotion, like the sensa which it includes in its complex, is a relational factor in the adjustive, valuing situation. It is, initially, an aspect of the organism's reception of the world. It is, finally, an aspect of the organism's active response to the world. In this latter sense, emotions can be "appropriate" or "objective." Emotions do not convey structural "knowledge" of things, nor are they strictly "copies" of things. But they do relate us to things and processes and give us, as James observed, a sense of the fixed as well as the transitive elements in our experience. As such, they are the baseline from which all cognition takes its start.

(b) Moreover, the productions of reason remain coercively subject in some way to the influence of qualities felt by the organism as basic, continuous, and constitutive of its existence. There is a demand that reason "square with" or at least not become incompatible with such qualities—a demand expressed in the periodic swings away from the extremities of rationalistic philosophies and toward intuition, "common sense" and tradition. It is true that the history of mathematics is the history of the overthrow of intuitions and the reconstruction of "common sense." But there is a deeper meaning of common sense. What the people of a civilization have in common is not merely ephemeral feelings and ideas; they possess also certain primitive notions, embedded in feeling, sanctioned by habit, half-articulated and seldom examined. People of modern societies, for instance, assume the notion of "negation"—a notion so primitive in the psychological sense that we require no demonstration of it but accept it as a compulsory and constitutive quality of our normal awareness. That this is not that, that red is not blue, that p and —p are opposites—this is an ingrained pattern of our apperceptive responses. It is the presupposition of all thought, and it arises from our direct sense of opposition (Peircean secondness), differentiation, and contrast. Conscious thought is coerced by it, and logic formulates it as a regulative principle. Reasoning that contradicts this sense of negation is normally resisted by one who has that sense. False claims and logical muddles "make no sense"; and the emotional vigor with which they are sometimes extirpated, attacked, and clarified is testimony to the power of the *affective* demand of the personality for coherence and truth. Zeno's paradoxes are a case in point: they laid bare for twenty-two hundred years a contradiction between thought and the disclosure of perception, implicitly mocking reason and challenging it to mend the hiatus. For while reason pronounced the heresy of motion, the runner fled before the imprisonment of the inquisitor, crying, "Nevertheless, I move." Not until modern mathematics could the inquisitor be convinced of his mistake; and

even he was happy to rest in the conclusion that running is not an altogether irrational thing.

Thus, if the conclusion of a line of reasoning violates the felt axiom of negation (formulated as the "law of non-contradiction") and indeed makes truth to be falsity, then a man will feel driven to examine the premises and processes of his reasoning. Or if inquiry reveals data that contradict established "facts" or "laws," confusion ensues: the inquiry is repeated, to discover a possible error in observation; calculations are checked; and if these researches yield no change in the data, the contradicted "facts" are examined. When the Michaelson-Morley experiments revealed that light does not drift with "ether," we can imagine the consternation; for the ordinary Newtonian concept of relative velocity was undermined, and men found themselves forced to reconstruct their naive notions of absolute space and absolute time. What disturbed them was not the disappearance of the valuable concept of "ether" but rather the "paradox" of the constancy of light for all observers, and the challenge to the assumption of simultaneity in nature. The point here is that the scholars cannot tolerate such paradoxes in thought; and because of their conviction that behind every apparent contradiction lies an order, progress in thought has occurred.[10]

Most thinkers would like Hume and Russell find themselves "affrighted," rebellious, or otherwise uneasy with a philosophy that could find no place for value judgments, moral habits, and traditions, and would seek a way out of that intolerable difficulty. The claims of reason may be persuasive, and the emotions may be unruly and uncertain; but it is certain root convictions, affectively held, that compel reason and provide it with the sense of importance, excitement, and refreshment which it needs to sustain its operations and inquiries.

(c) Reason as a process of connecting ideas is rooted in something even more concrete than qualitative response or conviction. If in its origins and operations reason is auxiliary and instrumental to the various interests of the organism and if it has no interest that is peculiarly its own, then it cannot be or generate its own guide but must look elsewhere for direction. Modern logical studies indicate that reason can tell us what must follow if certain propositions be true, but cannot tell us by logical processes that such premised propositions *must* be true. What must be true is first a matter of what exists as a necessity of our existence and secondly a matter of description of that necessity.

But let us suppose with DeWitt Parker that reason has a distinct interest of its own, namely, the interest in the harmony of all interests. Let us go still farther and suppose with Ralph Barton Perry that reflection is the instrument of the personal will, which it helps to fashion, and which dominates, as from above, the domain of personal interests. In either case, reason must be seen as a reflection and facilitation of a deeper and prior fact, the tendency of the whole organism toward more inclusive, integral, and vivid experience. Reason may describe this fact of our existence—a "necessity" in the sense that it is the identifying, generic character of our existence apart from which our lives as *human* beings would not be recognizable. Ultimately reason derives its most effective force and valuable guide from that creative tendency of our natures. At bottom, this guide is the impulsion of the organism to be, to become, to act and be acted upon in a pro-

[10]George D. W. Berry, "Paradox and Logical Uncertainty," *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. XV (1957).

gressively reconstructive way, to expand and differentiate its powers and link them with the powers of other beings. This guide is felt with a vague, unitary, affective tone. When things "go right," when our powers are lifted up and our feelings are likewise elated, when we approach unto that "knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature,"[11] which Spinoza called man's chief good—then our minds elucidate and affirm what is already implicit and promissory in the infant organism. For the minded organism, with its signs, is the refining, focussing, and intensifying of what is at first all tendency, all feeling. Mind is the instrument of a specialized adjustment, exacted out of transactions. It is the dialectic of subject-object engagement. For as Aristotle said not only does it have the capacity to receive and become all things, it is also (on its other, and, as he called it, its "higher" side) positive and creative, "like light," transforming the world.[12] And this mental transformation is an elaboration of what is germinal and typical in organisms at large, namely, a formative tendency issuing in graded levels of dynamic equilibrium.

When reason is seen in its *organismic* setting, then can we understand its relation to affect and the creativity which underlies affect. Biologically, affect has value: it prepares and precipitates adjustive action. It is the instrument of both bare survival and the creativity that lifts survival to advanced heights of expression. To "take care" has a double meaning: to care emotionally for life or some value of life, and to attend to the disciplines of practical and theoretical reason. The second follows from the first. We *at-tend* because we *tend* certain values; we take care intellectually because we care emotionally; we reason bceause we have a passion for living. Thus the passion for realism is the expression of a deeper-laid passion, and the "sentiment of rationality," as James was fond of calling it, is at bottom a sentiment for that felt consistency in our thought and practice which is an aspect of value and the growth of value in human life. Indeed, we should neither recognize nor cherish consistency as an ideal of the reason if we did not first need it as a demand of our naturc to live and to grow, and if it did not in some sense "satisfy" that need. Logical consistency is a special type of integration which is valued because we value integration generally. But logical consistency is never perfectly rigorous, and when it conflicts with our deeper and broader demands for consistency, we are driven to modify it and put it in its place.

II. REASON.

Thus reason and affect arise from a common source, the organism engaged in transactions with things and events and driven by an urge to perpetuate and extend its value-experiences. Sense, emotions, and feelings are the qualitative side of the continuous re-adjustments forced upon the organism in its conflicts with the world.[13] All affect, and particularly emotion, is evoked when the organism senses the threat or promise of immediate value in events, i.e., when it responds to events valuatively. Emotion is the accelerating, heightening, particularizing, and inchoate structuring of our pervasive qualitative awareness, and it accompanies the accelerating and heightening of energy. It is preparatory in this sense; but it has its own intrinsic value.

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[11] *On the Improvement of the Understanding.* Trans. Elwes, Bohn.

[12] *De Anima.* Trans. J. A. Smith. Book III, ch. 4, 429 ff.

[13] Lawrence K. Frank holds that this is true of emotions; but the claim here is that all affect is an aspect of physiological adjustment. See Frank's *Feelings and Emotions* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1954).

Similarly, reason, in its origin, is an adjustive mechanism: when successful it functions as the patterning and transformation of qualitative data to the end of eliminating the disturbing tension between personality and environment, or between parts of the personality. Whether practical or theoretical, reason is conflict-resolving activity. Under the stimulus of a drive generated by a felt need and some obstruction to the fulfillment of that need, the organism seeks a more or less dimly defined goal. What it needs is relief of its need, i.e., removal of the obstruction, and restored equilibrium; as means to that, it requires a pattern of events that can be put forward and that can put the organism forward toward its goal—a proposal, a hypothesis—that might disentangle the organism from its maladjustment and free it for reaching the goal and attaining fulfillment.

This patterning is initially the work of reason. It is made possible by the abstractive and selective powers of the nervous system, by memory, and by the capacity of the human organism to delay its responses.[14] These powers are brought to a focus and are extended by the development of symbols. Reason in human beings is thus behavior wherein signs, produced and combined into definite orders by the organism, organize (or prepare for organization) the behavior of the organism.

When the organism is confronted with an obstacle to the fulfillment of some particular need, it may react in any of a number of non-rational ways, or it may react rationally. Rational behavior involves the execution of certain steps toward the obtaining of the goal sought. Obstruction and a preliminary sensing of the situation lead to a clarified discernment of events and relations and to a conscious awareness or formulation of the problematic situation. Such awareness may then call to mind some possible pattern or portion of a pattern of events (including human activity) which has in the past proved successful in the resolution of difficulties of a similar kind. Such an "ideal" pattern or hypothesis carries a positive charge of valuation. In the light of this pattern the situation is then surveyed, and by symbolic action (deduction) and experiment, events are connected to see if they can be so ordered as to lead to the desired and anticipated outcome.

Thus, by the production of signs which specify a certain order, and by consequent action which effects a certain order of events, we may re-order our actions, our sensa, our emotions, our feelings, our energized activity, and our relations to the objective world. Practical reason, as Dewey and others have shown, is the process of transforming the emotions of conflict into emotions of integration by experimental action that proceeds under the guidance of symbols. With minor differences, the procedures of practical reason are the same regardless of the field of practice; the affects are transformed and ordered whether one is engaged in solving problems of chemistry or is directly concerned with personal behavior as in psychotherapy.

As for emotions, it is a trusim that we may handle them, particularly the violent ones of fear and hostility, by expressing and handling the energy aroused in connection with them. The orderly handling of energy involves the ordering of our interactions with events and hence the ordering of our sensory world. In this way the disruptive effects of emotion may be smoothed out and the strong

[14]Delayed response is a central concept in the social psychology of George Herbert Mead. This phenomenon is due in part to the abundance of internuncial cells in spinal and cortical centers. See John Pfeiffer, *The Human Brain*, p. 26 (as cited in "The Anatomy for Freedom," unpublished paper by Corinne C. Frost).

shifts of emotional quality may be eased and assuaged by the orders of action and sensory perception. Thus, as manager of emotions expressed in the struggles to live, and to live well, reason coordinates man and his world in mutually sustaining and modifying interactions, and becomes the art and the science of living. This last is the most concrete function of reason.

In addition to its power to order qualities, reason may also facilitate their emergence. When we reason, we employ signs to make assertions about observed and inferred events, we explicate the meanings of those assertions (operations and sensory observations), and we undertake then to put those meanings to practical test. The meanings of reason (propositions) always pertain to qualities and their relations; and insofar as new propositions arise—either in experimental interactions or on the linked highways of deduction or in the free flights of the imagination—new qualities may also arise and indeed lure reason onward. As a search for pattern, reason leads to both a manipulating and undergoing of events, to both contact qualities and consummatory qualities. It releases the organism into qualitative interactions, and in turn is released by them.

III. VALUE.

Some philosophers have found it convenient to separate reason from affect and hence reason from value. But neither reason nor affect alone can provide a touchstone for value. Reason and affect are functional aspects of the whole dynamic organism. Affect is the resultant of the impact of the world on our value-sensitivity as experiencers; action is our overt response to that world; and reason, as the mediator between the two, expresses our structured judgment of the world and our response to it. Affect is the creation (or the re-creation) of the world in us; our action is the creation (or the re-creation) of the world; and it is the creative function of reason to provide guides for forming and judging our affects with respect to the advance of value.

Among those who have defended the view that reason must be separated from emotion, at least in matters of value, A. J. Ayer is representative. He writes:

> Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.[15]

But is this what is meant? When I say, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money", I mean

> You stole that money.
> Stealing is wrong.
> Therefore you were wrong in stealing that money.

The validity and truth of this conclusion hinge on the meaning and truth of the utterance, "Stealing is wrong." Let us assume for the moment that the utterance is dependent in some way on the expression, "Stealing is bad." What, then, can that mean? I take it to be an assertion that a certain act of taking, absconding, etc., with certain observable properties, has also the property "bad." But, it will be objected, "bad" is a property that belongs to you and not to the act of stealing; you merely *ascribe* it to the objective act. This objection, I hold,

[15] *Language, Truth and Logic* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1936), Ch. VI.

is partially true and partially false. It is true insofar as I as subjective do feel disapproval and do make a value judgment—there would be no realized value for me if I did not engage in the act of valuing. But it is false insofar as it implies that the judgment has no relation to objective conditions. I hold that value judgments of the sort, "Stealing is bad," can be true or false in at least three senses.

(1) "Bad" is predominantly an emotive expression; it signifies my valuative response to things as they are, and it arises in part in virtue of the properties of those things. "Bad" is not literally a property that attaches to me, unless I am utterly mistaken and the state of judgment becomes no more than a state and has no reference. What is intended as meant is that an observed, objective activity affects the speaker in a certain emotive and conative way. When this objective activity is responded to valuatively and symbolized, something of *import* is asserted *of* the action of stealing. "Bad" thus has a dual reference: it refers to something objective (in virtue of which the emotional response is had) and also to the emotional or valuative response toward that object.

But, it will be asked, how can "badness" be a property of things or acts? What we mean primitively by "something bad" is "something bad for me" or "something bad for men"—something considered injurious to us, destructive of us, not able to sustain me or us, obstructive of the fulfillment of my or our needs. And therefore whether the expression, "Stealing is bad," is true or false can be decided by clarification of "bad" (in the manner suggested), and by empirical inquiry. Value (or disvalue) in this sense is individual and objective. The appraisal of something as "bad" is different from the empirical investigation of whether it *is* bad (in the sense indicated) but can be checked and objectified by such investigation.

(2) But then someone says, "Bad" may mean, "not pleasant," "not satisfying," "not conducive to happiness in the long run," etc. True; what the objection means is that concepts of what sustains or does not sustain man (concepts of value) differ from person to person. And so the further question arises. What are the invariant conditions which sustain man regardless of his concept of the good and regardless of his value judgments? What are the conditions which sustain man as man? (This question involves more than one individual man.) This is a question that in principle can be answered in the affirmative, for it involves clarification of the nature of "man as man" and empirical inquiry into conditions. Value (or disvalue) in this sense is generic and objective.

(3) Every valuative response is accompanied by a disposition to act—a positive valuative response is accompanied by a disposition to seek and sustain the object approved; a negative valuative response, by a disposition to avoid and eliminate the object disapproved. If the valuer feels or believes the object to be sustaining to him or to others with whom he is identified, then he in turn will incline to act to sustain it; if he does not so believe, he will not so act. Consequently, the expression, "Stealing is bad," or "That stealing is bad," imports a prediction that I will act to eliminate that stealing. To the extent that I do so act, then the imported prediction and the concomitant value judgment are true; to the extent that I do not, they are false. Thus value judgments may be true or false to the extent that they involve predictions as to whether the speaker will or will not operatively prefer an object, i.e., will or will not act to seek and sustain it.[16]

[16]This analysis of value has relied heavily on the work of Charles W. Morris.

The use of the terms "wrong," "duty," "ought," "obligation" make explicit the conative element in the value judgment. For "bad" means not only that something is "bad for me" or "bad for us" but also that I feel a demand to do something to prevent or eliminate it. To say, "Stealing is wrong," means that I feel a general demand to act against stealing; it expresses a habit or rule of action for myself as well as for others. Whether such a generalized rule can be justified—i.e., whether the expression, "Stealing ought to be stopped" is true—is again a question of whether acts of stealing are bad in the individual or generic sense.

In short, value is a sustaining relation which a man has to his world. Such a relation involves an order of events and an affective tone. Value is an affective order experienced by man. Reason may participate in such an order or be instrumental to the production of such order. Values of course conflict, change, decrease, and increase. What fulfills man's generic nature is the increase of values; it is his growth. Affective order is the basic unit of human value; the increase of this is generic human value.

To be alive, to experience value, is to apprehend with feeling, think, communicate, control and serve—where the emergence and increase of qualities is in issue. It is to realize value in and for itself (where value is qualitative order), and to alter oneself and the conditions of one's life so that they may become instruments for the further realization of value. Of such is the meaning of human freedom and security: to be able to feel, sense, and have emotion with increasing precision and scope; to be able to symbolize and structure that mounting world of qualities, preserving it in memory and in art and predicting what might come; to be able to respond emphathetically to the qualities and symbolic forms, rational and esthetic, of others; to be able to act with power over the events and problems that confront one; and to be able to surrender oneself in religious commitment to this process of transformation.

Reason is one agent for the achievement of this transformation; for reason may effect the required transformation by the discernment and application of the means-ends relations in events, by the description of basic principles, methods, and ideals, and by the power of deductive elaboration. Reason can tell us the truth about values and how to achieve them.

The life of reason, which is the life of well-regulated and far-seeing symbols, can bring a calm and security into the domain of the senses, the emotions, the feelings, and the various activities of man. But not only do its orders supervene upon the life of man and civilize it; reason, in addition to the broad sweep of its contemplative powers, becomes participant in the affairs of business and industry, of politics and religion, and, as is inevitable with anyone who uses reason seriously, must take its philosophic function to be a kingly one, seeking to define the generic goals of human living, and, with other men, to find the means for attaining those goals. In the final judgment, reasonable men are incomplete and miss their human calling if they fail to see reason not only as an intrinsic value but also as a servant which must discern the outlines of the good life for all and then join itself to cooperative practice that will bring that about.

Why do we act upon personal and civic problems? Why do we reason? Why do we engage in art? Why do we play? We may do so out of an inescapable necessity, compounded out of our needs and the other forces in our situation. We may be driven by a specific impulse and fired by a particular passion. But

(*Continued on page 126*)

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA AS CATEGORIES FOR SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

BY SIGURD RISLOV

SCIENCE MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS WAYS OF MAKING SENSE OUT OF THE WORLD. One decisive difference between these ways and other more ordinary common sense ways is that the former have sets of categories or basic terms with special definitions that are different from those of ordinary common sense. These basic terms, or categories, permit the scientist to construct rationally consistent systems from which empirical inferences can be made that reveal more telling information about the world than is revealed by ordinary common sense categories. The scientist can make sense out of the particular segment of the world in question in such a way that a whole new area of dependable knowledge and consequent possible human activity emerges. Examples of such categories in physics are mass, energy, and field.

Such special categories are found also in the social sciences. These are less standardized than those in, say, physics. Nevertheless, to the extent that social sciences have progressed beyond reporting perceptions, they have developed their own categories which provide in varying degrees the ground for rational structures from which more significant and revealing empirical inferences about social phenomena can be made than can otherwise be made.

Because of the large area of the social sciences in which categories are not standardized, one very important activity for social scientists is the selection and clarification of categories which will improve the ways of making sense out of social phenomena.

When any such categories are used in inquiry or consequent description of social phenomena, the extent to which they represent the subjective characteristics of their employer, that is the extent to which the terms are indices to their user's personal characteristics and to his culture, and the extent to which they may be considered as adequately representing congruous conditions of social phenomena is of primary concern in evaluating them for at least two reasons. One reason is that until such a determination is made the relevancy of the description is unknown. Another reason is that rational development of a systematic discipline for inquiry presupposes such determination.

This article will explain and show some use of two categories that have proven fruitful in examining this problem and also in making sense of social phenomena. The fact that these categories are fruitful in these two ways makes extending acquaintance with them desirable. The fact that misunderstanding of these categories occurs makes clarification of them important.

These two categories are ideology and utopia. They are used to designate ideas which transcend social realities. The essential distinction between them is that while ideologies serve to gloss over or stabilize existing social orders, utopias serve to arouse social action designed to change the existing social order on their behalf. Both include conceptions which are transcendent in the sense that they

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cannot be realized within the existing state of affairs and it would be impracticable or impossible to live and act consistently according to them within the limits of the concurrent social order.

A brief sketch of some of the history and use of these categories will be presented culminating, in each case, with an explanation of Karl Mannheim's treatment of them in a series of essays published under the title *Ideology and Utopia.*[1]

Before this sketch and history is given, two considerations relevant thereto will be mentioned.

One of these is that the cognitive level of an intellectual discipline is shown by the degree to which the main categories of the discipline are: (1) conscious departures from the direct representations of naive realism, and (2) the extent to which the categories elicit logically consistent structures from which empirically verifiable significant inferences can be made.

It should be noted that a vast variety of contrary and contradictory categories might satisfy number one. Number two states the procedures for choosing among these and of revising, reconstructing and extending the ones chosen.

The second consideration is that although in a history of rational thought the displacement of inept categories with fertile ones would be the subject matter of the history, in a social or political history the inept persist along with the fruitful and may remain socially or politically dominant both in the culture and in individuals. The same items which in a rational history are on the intellectual dunghill, in a social history may still be a society's daily bread.

The extent to which displaced and displacing items in a history of rational thought are found surviving contemporaneously in the same individual is an index to his self and also to the culture of which he is a member. An example of this is in contemporary cultures where categories designating the supernatural persist as ways of making sense of phenomena, along with the categories of the sciences that succeeded them. Persistence of this type may be enhanced when the categories' contributions to knowledge approach zero (thereby avoiding conflict with contributing systems) and when they augment social controls. Identification of these items with institutions whose survival is regarded as an end in itself may be another significant cause of their persistence, if not a necessary one. Similar persistence of other categories occurs in the political and economic areas, especially where corresponding institutions are involved.

Such persistence in individuals and in society shows their ability to appropriate an intellectual advance without comprehending it. This ability is a necessary condition of such lags. (And, of course, it is possible that such lags are empirically necessary, although, not sufficient conditions for advance, inasmuch as society is therewith stabilized by the old without necessarily rejecting the new, thus providing the delay needed for the slower, albeit implicit, emotional reform to occur.)

Comprehension of intellectual advances may be delayed, even in the individuals making them, because of the extent to which the contents of their conceptual apparatus are the consequences of membership in a particular culture and represent that fact rather than representing congruous situations.

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[1]Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936).

These two considerations are among those that highlight the sort of inquiry in which ideology and utopia are significant categories. This will become apparent in the description of them that follows.

The worth of these categories for social analysis depends on the extent to which they yield a rationally consistent system and the extent to which significant inferences from it can be empirically verified. This explanation will be about elements of the categories pertinent to a rationally consistent system.

Included in these elements are the implications of these categories respecting knowledge and truth (presuming that in the case of humans, knowledge implies truth and truth implies knowledge) and respecting communication. Consequently, these will be mentioned, inasmuch as should the categories by implication make communication or knowledge and truth impossible, this would seem to disqualify them as means for making sense out of anything.

Since substantially the same considerations regarding communication apply to both categories, this part of the analysis will be limited to ideology.

The term situtional determinism will be used to indicate the doctrine that meanings have as part of their content the social or cultural persuasion of which their employer is a member.

Ideology. Ideology will be examined first, then utopia.

The concept of ideology may be regarded as a consequence of consciously attributing causal efficacy to social situations in producing the deceptions which one detects in a political adversary's representations.[2]

Political conflict between groups is as ancient as history. Where such conflict occurs, there frequently is willful deception. There may also be deceptions which although patent to the adversary are not apparent to the deceiver. The concept of ideology looks for the causes of this deceit in the social situation of the person in question, thereby introducing perspectivalism, or the doctrine that beliefs are relative to the believer's perspective.

This doctrine is not of recent origin. The formula of Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things"—is familiar to literate members of western civilization. The perspectivalism of the Sophists was not a consequence of attempts at social analysis, nor was it intended as a methodology for that purpose. Rather, the critical approach fostered by philosophy was being applied to philosophy itself. The result was a relativistic perspectivalism concerning knowledge and ethics. To the extent that this movement pointed up the need for adequate theories of knowledge and ethics, it did serve to "unmask" current beliefs. Beyond that it would be unwarranted to claim relevance of the Sophist movement to the use of ideology under consideration here.

There were three thinkers at the beginning of the seventeenth century whose doctrines are significant in the development of the concept of ideology. They are Francis Bacon, Descartes, and Comenius.

Francis Bacon's idols of the tribe, cave, market place, and theatre, discussed in his *Novum Organum*, are a pertinent development in the type of thought under

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

discussion. Bacon is not saying that true knowledge is impossible, nor is he saying that false beliefs represent deliberate deceptions on the part of those who own them. In two of the instances—the idols of the tribe and cave—the errors are due to propensities of the human mind and peculiarities of individuals. But the idols of the market place and of the theatre are consequences of social situations.

Although Bacon calls these errors, rather than reality transcending ideas, the meanings in this case are similar. These ideas are regarded as causally determined by social situations. Bacon does not indicate the significance of this concept for social analysis. His burden is to develop a methodology for empirical science. Nor is he especially concerned with the effect of these ideas on social action. His concern is with their restraining influence on the development of empirical science.

Similarly in the case of Descartes, his attempt in his *Discourse on Method and Meditation on First Philosophy* to divest himself of the bias caused by his social situation is well known. Both of these, Bacon and Descartes, were taking note of what might be called a "false consciousness" consequent to membership in a social persuasion. Neither of them developed the possibilities of this approach for social analysis. Both recognized situational determinism as a fact and sought to indicate a methodology for surmounting it.

Comenius' use of the meaning of ideology occurs in his *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart.*[3] This is the story of a pilgrim taken through the world who eventually entertains Christ in his heart—and all is well. The important part for the purposes of this discussion is Comenius' representation of three categories as perspectives.

At the beginning of the trip the pilgrim is fitted with glasses which make social events and relations appear as they are purported to be by the standard representations of the age. These standard representations are reality transcending ideas that gloss over social realities and prevent change—in other words, they are ideologies, the first category.

The pilgrim manages to peer under the glasses occasionally and get a glimpse of social realities as they really are. Here Comenius has a second category of ideas congruous with social reality.

Eventually, when the pilgrim has taken Christ into his heart, and so forth, he is given another pair of glasses. He then sees the world in yet another way. Knowledge and values acquire new content and organization. This is the third and utopian category. Comenius is saying that the utopian mentality is essential to content and organization of knowledge and value.

Although he is employing his analysis for religious purposes, it is pertinent background to the present usage of ideology and utopia in social analysis because, although not labeling the terms or categories, he does employ them. They are employed by him to unmask his opponents and obtain social action. They are also employed as epistemic and normative categories, that is, as a basis for determining content and meaning of knowledge and values, and as directives for their systematization.

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[3]John Amos Comenius, *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart*, tr. by Mathew Spinka (Chicago: The National Union of Czechoslovak Protestants in America, 1942), pp. 133–55.

In recent times, a major contributor to the development of ideology as a category for social analysis was Karl Marx. He used the term "ideologies" to indicate those situationally transcendent ideas which were representations of conflicting social forces—primarily productive forces and productive relations. Changes in social organization consequent to this conflict are reflected in changed ideologies.

> In the social productions which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. . . . The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.[4]

> At a certain stage of development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production . . . with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production, these relations turn into fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.[5]

This illustrates one way in which the category Marx calls "ideological forms," obviously embracing both ideology and utopia, can be employed in social analysis. It also shows the lag between ideologies and social realities.

Marx considered his own ideas as congruous with social reality, but apparently considered all others to be "ideological forms." This ideological approach is often used in Marxism as a technique for "unmasking" one's adversaries. The total conception of ideology would require that one's own position be subject to the same analysis.

The Particular and Total Conception of Ideology. The culminating figure is Karl Mannheim. As background for contemporary social analysis, Mannheim distinguishes between the earlier *particular* conception of ideology and the later *total* conception of ideology. By the particular conception he means the consideration of an opponent's ideas or representations as disguises (intentional or self deceptive) of his real motives or beliefs. By total ideology he means the ideology of the age or period, or of a "concrete historico-social group."[6] It is this latter type of ideology that is of concern here.

In this total ideology, he states, it no longer makes sense to talk of willful disguise, because ideology constitutes the entire conceptual framework of the thinker in question. The meanings of a person's thoughts or statements include non-theoretical "existential" factors involved in their origin. This constitutes situational determinism. It applies to the person making the observation as well as to the person about whom the observation is being made.

Objects which transcend social realities, that is, which do not exist in the actual situation, are the content of ideologies. As long as adherence to such

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[4]Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Second Revised Ed. (New York: The International Library Publishing Company, 1904), p. 11. [5]*Ibid.*, p. 12.

[6]Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), pp. 49–50.

objects serves to gloss over or stabilize the existing order, they are ideologies. When they are embodied in actual conduct aiming to change social reality to conform with them, they are called utopias.[7]

Every culture contains ideologies, he says. The inquirer, recognizing this to be true of his culture as well as others, if he is to become cognizant of social realities, must either develop a procedure for overcoming or neutralizing his ideological persuasion, or develop a procedure within the persuasion which will somehow provide him with dependable knowledge.

At this point, Mannheim indicates, the theory of ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge and becomes a category in social analysis raising by implication the question, mentioned earlier, about the nature of knowledge and truth, and about communication.[8]

It is apparent that an epistemology which assumes a realm of "truth as such" cannot account for knowledge in the circumstances described above, other than as relativistic knowledge.

Perspectivalism and Truth. According to Mannheim, the individual does not come into the world with ready made abilities with which he constructs a world view, and then compares this world view with those arrived at independently by other individuals.[9] On the contrary, most of his world, including the conceptual and categorical components, are assimilated by him from his social environment. What historico-social facts can be known to him are, to that extent, predetermined.

When disagreements are due to differing perspectives, the problem arises of how to determine which perspective is the true or better one. Even a decision that some other perspecitive was superior to one's own would itself be perspectival and subject to consequent predetermination of meanings. This would preclude from that evaluation the distinctive peculiarities of the other.

At this juncture, it appears that unless a standard perspective is provided to which others can be compared, one is left with an infinite or circular series of perspectives, each with some meanings hermetically sealed.

However, Mannheim maintains that "the fact that all thought is related to a certain historico-social situation does not rob it of all possibility of attaining the truth."[10]

If truth is taken to mean the successful outcome of inquiry, then the infinite or circular series of views does not preclude truth. So defined, truth does not depend on a standard view to which others can be compared. The superiority of one view over another would lie in the fact that intelligent action undertaken on its behalf was more fruitful than similar action on behalf of other views.

This is the instrumentalist theory of truth. Mannheim accepts the essentials of this theory. "Thought and its models are instruments for dealing with life situations at the disposal of a certain kind of vital being under certain conditions of life."[11]

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 25–30.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 124.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 268.

He does not, however, subscribe to the instrumentalist theory of truth as *the* theory of truth. Instead he holds that concepts of truth are themselves perspectival and conditioned by the kinds of knowledge operative in the social persuasion that generates them.[12]

Knowledge, in all situations, is a natural phenomenon implicit in which is a meaningful and practical distinction between truth and falsity. It is the task of theories of truth to account for knowledge, not negate it. When such theories do not account for knowledge they should be revised so that they will.

> New forms of knowledge, in the last analysis, grow out of the conditions of collective life and do not depend for their emergence upon prior demonstration by a theory of knowledge that they are possible; they do not therefore need to be first legitimized by epistemology. The relationship is actually quite the reverse. . . . [13]

To conclude, Mannheim holds that perspectivalism consequent to ideology is a fact. Whatever theory of knowledge (or truth) is most consistent with this fact is the one to be accepted. Among available theories, instrumentalism seems most consistent.

The Problem of Communication. In order for persons to communicate, consensus or agreement on meanings is essential. However, in a heterogeneous culture there are various perspectives, and communication between representatives of them presents difficulties. If meanings are peculiar to social persuasions, then the total content of those meanings can be communicated only to members of that persuasion. Mannheim suggests two possible directions in which attempts to solve this difficulty may go.

One of these is to find a formula for translating the results of one perspective into the results of the other. Such translation requires the discovery of common denominators in the different persuasions. On the basis of these common denominators, the remaining differences can then be separated into (a) those differences which are necessary differences due to differences in meaning consequent to the peculiarities of the social persuasions in question, and (b) those differences which are not necessary differences but are arbitrary, mistaken elements.[14]

The problem of the best perspective can then be decided in favor of the one "which gives evidence of the greatest comprehensiveness and the greatest fruitfulness in dealing with empirical materials"—in other words, that which holds the possibility for the widest consensus, and which best meets the instrumentalist test of truth.[15]

The other possible direction suggested by Mannheim is toward neutralizing perspectives by rising above them. As two persuasions come in juxtaposition, the inquirer seeks to transcend them—not by rising into a sphere of truth as such, but by broadening the base of his view so as to include both persuasions. This broadening of the base can be done only by eliminating those differences which are due to the peculiarities of the persuasions concerned. The result is a higher degree of abstractness and formalization.[16] This is observable wherever various groups of different persuasions are amalgamated.

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[12] *Loc. cit.*
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 259.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 270.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 271.
[16] *Loc. cit.*

> . . . the capacity for abstraction among individuals and groups grows in the measure that they are parts of heterogeneous groups and organizations in more inclusive collective units capable of absorbing local or otherwise particular groups.[17]

This process is described as the "social genesis of abstraction." Since, as indicated, this process neutralizes the particular qualitative elements peculiar to the separate persuasions, its view of social subject matter is a functional view "modeled after a purely mechanical pattern" allowing only "certain formal and structural components of the phenomena to emerge into the foreground of experience and thought."[18]

Perspectivalism operates even here, for the typology employed in the formalization is itself a product of the concrete social situation from which it emerges.

This is how Mannheim's use of ideology makes communication and agreement basic components of knowledge and truth.

Utopia. Although the utopian mentality appears early in history, the use of the concept in conscious departures from the direct representations of naive realism and as part of a rationally consistent system which was to be the basis for fruitful empirical inferences is a recent occurence.

As mentioned earlier, what has been said about ideology respecting perspectivalism, communication, knowledge and truth pertains equally to utopia. To avoid reiteration the explanation of utopia will be limited to elements not previously explained.

Hertzler finds the utopian mentality in the Hebrew prophets.

Isaiah's utopia, for example, was the reign of Jehovah's King on earth.[19] Probably the prophets expected action due to their reality transcending ideas. These ideas were also employed as grounds for empirical and normative judgments.

The Christians kept the prophets' utopia but transplanted it to heaven. Its determinate effect on the content and organization of values should not require further comment.

A striking instance of conscious employment of utopia for epistemic and normative purposes is Plato's *Republic*. Plato constructed a utopia to clarify the meaning of justice and to provide both content and systematization for values and for knowledge.

There is little indication that Plato's *Republic* was the cause for social action, beyond his purported trips to Syracuse.

Another individually produced utopia of significance to the development of this usage is John Amos Comenius' *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart*.[20] His use of the utopian category, and of ideology, and of a third

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 272–73.

[19] Joyce O. Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), pp. 25–27.

[20] John Amos Comenius, *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart*, tr. by Mathew Spinka (Chicago: The National Union of Czechoslovak Protestants in America, 1942), 170 pp.

category which designates ideas congruent with social realities has been explained in connection with ideology.

Another significant contributor is Karl Marx. Although Marxism is implicitly utopian, the contributions of Marx were directed toward the "unmasking" of the ideologies of the ruling classes—or of anyone who disagreed with him—and describing the social forces operative in bringing about the utopian order, rather than toward the formulation of utopia or examining it as a category for social inquiry. Consequently, he was presented at greater length in the discussion of ideology.

Four more representative contributors are Georges Sorel, Vilfredo Pareto, Lewis Mumford, and Karl Mannheim. All of these represent a level of development where the utopian category is consciously employed to explain social events.

Georges Sorel represents this approach in his *Reflections on Violence*.[21] He calls such reality transcending ideas myths. The social myth with which he is primarily concerned is the general strike, which he describes as—

> The myth in which socialism is wholly comprised, i.e. a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against modern society.[22]

The doctrine of syndicalism is not to the point here. Its employment of reality transcending ideas as bases for social action and grounds for giving meaning to events is pertinent.

Sorel emphasizes the importance of such myths for social action. He denies that they do or can constitute dependable blueprints of the future. In fact, he rejects all attempts to determine the conditions of a future society. "The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense."[23]

Besides the use of reality transcending ideas to generate social action he finds this category useful for understanding social events.[24] The epistemic and normative roles of such ideas is not emphasized.

Vilfredo Pareto similarly emphasizes the importance of reality transcending ideas as mechanisms for achieving concrete social ends. "We may say, in brief, that to aim at an imaginary objective, T, in order to attain a real end m, is frequently an indispensable, yet, none the less an imperfect means of achieving m."[25] Pareto doubts that it is possible to replace imaginary ideals with real purposes and so render social life "logico-experimental." Evidence for this, he says, is that even the "best educated" resort to metaphysics in some guise or other.[26]

Both Sorel and Pareto represent the "romantic" tradition emphasizing the irrationality of man in social relationships and normative judgments.

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[21]Georges Sorel, *Reflections of Violence*, tr. by T. E. Hulme (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1915), 299 pp.

[22]*Ibid.*, pp. 136–37.

[23]*Ibid.*, p. 136, 155.

[24]*Ibid.*, pp. 133–34.

[25]Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, tr. by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), Vol. III, p. 1308.

[26]*Ibid.*, pp. 1308–09.

They use a category of situation transcending ideas as a method of social analysis, and emphasize the importance of such ideas for social action. Sorel says there is no systematic relationship between such ideas and consequent action. Pareto admits some, but denies that it can be formulated in the categories of logical-empirical inquiry.

The third representative employing the utopian category for social analysis is Lewis Mumford. In his *The Story of Utopias* he has used such descriptive terms as "Coketown" and "Country House" to designate configurations of values functioning as utopias.[27] He distinguishes between the utopian ideas which are inoperative in changing society, and those that encourage social action. The latter he terms utopias of reconstruction.[28]

Mumford's emphasis is on the use of the utopia category for understanding social subject matter, and on the importance of utopias in securing social action. Little attention is given to the consequences of the utopian mentality to the content and organization of knowledge and value.

Mannheim's Utopia. According to Mannheim, reorganization of social structures has occurred in the past through the efforts of groups that were utopian minded. Every major culture has permitted differential groups to develop within it who became the sponsors of ideas representing the unfulfilled and frustrated needs of the age. They are the new wine that breaks the old skins. "The existing order gives birth to utopias which in turn break the bonds of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence."[29]

"Utopias" which are only an individual's creation do not qualify as utopian in the sense the term is used by Mannheim, unless the utopia embodies the aspirations of a group or class which undertakes to change the social order accordingly.

Once the utopian inspired group has burst the bonds and entered into the control strata of society, they adapt their ideas to the new situation.[30] Out of this synthesis new utopian elements develop and the process is repeated.

Mannheim does not apply this dialectical approach as though it were a metaphysical principle—a preestablished order. He presents it as a principle to direct his inquiry.

The Decline of the Utopian Mentality. Mannheim finds that in the modern era (the last 600 years) utopia has proceeded from what he calls "Chiliasm" (wishes that involve projection into time, rather than spatial reorganization), toward ideas that more and more approximate real life.[31]

The decisive turning point in the modern era was when "Chiliasm" joined forces with "oppressed" strata of society which resulted in such movements as that of the Hussites and the Anabaptists. From this point utopianism began its descent to earth, until at present it is scarcely distinguishable from social

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[27]Lewis Mumford, *The Story of Utopias* (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922), 315 pp.
[28]*Ibid.*, p. 21.
[29]Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
[30]*Ibid.*, p. 224.
[31]*Ibid.*, pp. 185–222.

norms concerning concrete practices.[32] Utopianism has become less and less "reality transcending."

The consequence of this continued descent to the here and now is what Mannheim calls the conservative mentality. When this occurs the utopian mentality has so identified its aims with the existing order that the question "Where to?" is no longer raised in a meaningful way. The emphasis shifts from "Where to?" to "Know how." "Where to?" is imbedded in the here and now. Consequently, what was once the utopian mentality is now concerned, not with changing the social order, but instead, with doing more efficiently what is already being done.

This state of affairs is also reflected in the academic world. Sciences become attached to existing practices on a "rendering assistance" basis. Sociology is segmented into numerous special areas which aid in dealing with special problems arising in municipal or industrial government. Philosophy becomes analytic rather than synthetic. There is no longer a search for a world view on which to ground an answer to the question "Where to?" since that question no longer compels concern. Academic disciplines enlist in the service of "Know how."

Significance of the Decline of the Utopian Mentality. Mannheim stresses two significant consequences of the decline of utopian mentality. One of these concerns what will be called here the "rational will." The other concerns the problem of knowledge.

By the rational will is meant the propensity for directing one's actions by eliciting or subduing, as the case may merit, one's feelings and impulses; and employing one's control over the environment, in order to realize a comprehensive aim. Such a goal generates what James called the "strenuous mood." It transforms the components of experience into good or evil. Actions whose meaning and influence otherwise are limited to the immediate sensate response become significant to a rational plan for a life dedicated to something believed to be "greater" and "nobler" than the matter of fact here and now.

Without this dedication, this utopian mentality, Mannheim maintains that man has no categorical imperative on which to ground a rational life. Without such a ground he becomes a creature of the here and now—a victim of his impulses—forever wrestling with unrelated problems in a hopelessly segmented situation. The result is degeneration of both the individual and his society.

The second area in which the significance of the decline of the utopian mentality is stressed by Mannheim is that of knowledge. As suggested above, the meanings of components of the here and now include elements of what is deemed possible and desirable in the future—the utopian mentality.

The future presents itself as possibilities. In order to choose one of these possibilities there must be an imperative "ought". A person must wilfully choose a possibility. If anything is to come of this choice, there must also be an imperative "ought"—a utopia—that drives him toward its fulfillment.

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[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 190–227.

Under such circumstances the objects of knowledge derive part of their content from the relationship they bear to the utopia. A basis is thereby provided for the construction and systematization of objects of knowledge. Without such a basis objects of knowledge are related only to here and now circumstances whose only imperative is "Know how." Since the resulting content and organization of knowledge is no longer pertinent to future oriented behaviour, man becomes thereby incapacitated to intentionally influence his own destiny.

As the last vestiges of the utopian mentality disappear, the imperative for "Know how" itself vanishes. The reason is that this imperative was a constituent of the utopian mentality which mentality eventually became imbedded in the here and now. The only remaining imperative is that of immediate impulses which are also consequently the sole source of content and organization of knowledge. Thus, knowledge is limited to the immediate and particular. To the extent that possibilities of knowledge rely on the utopian mentality its deterioration effaces those possibilities.

The following quotation from Mannheim summarizes these two consequences.

> The complete disappearance of the utopian element from human thought and action would mean that human nature and human development would take on a totally new character. The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than a thing. We would be faced then with the greatest paradox imaginable, namely, that man, who has achieved the highest degree of rational mastery of existence, left without any ideals, becomes a mere creature of impulses. Thus after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history, and thereby his ability to understand it.[33]

Summary. What has just been said about utopia shows how when this category is used sense is made of social phenomena in a way that is different from that of ordinary common sense. This was also shown respecting ideology. Of greater importance, of course, is the determination of whether or not this way is superior to common sense and other ways.

This can be done by evaluating the rational system implicit in the categories. Such evaluation would show the logical consistency of the system and its adequacy for inquiry. The latter would be determined by the extent to which it provided new, dependable and significant knowledge—knowledge which made possible additional intelligent behaviour, both in respect to the empirical world and in respect to augmenting the rational system.

Such procedures occur in the development of categories in any science. Preliminary clarification of the categories is an important part of such development.

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

AN ANALYSIS OF THEODORE BRAMELD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RECONSTRUCTIONISM

BY LYNN L. WELDON

1. Introduction

THIS PAPER PRESENTS AN ANALYSIS OF THEODORE BRAMELD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RECONSTRUCTIONISM AS IT WAS PRESENTED IN HIS BOOKS, *Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective*, published in 1955, and *Toward A Reconstructed Philosophy of Education*, published in 1956. These books are "extensive and intensive revisions" of an earlier book, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*. Brameld sets up four philosophies of education: Essentialism, Progressivism, Perennialism and Reconstructionism.

Here is a brief summary of the four philosophies:

> . . . The essentialist is the conservative because, however "liberal" his protestations, he would solve the problems of our time by developing behavior skilled mainly in conserving, rather than in changing, the essential content and structure of the pre-existent world. The progressivist is the genuine liberal because he would meet our crisis by developing minds and habits skilled as instruments in behalf of progressive, gradual, evolutionary change. The perennialist is the regressivist because he would deal with contemporary issues by reacting against them in favor of solutions extraordinarily similar to those of a culture long past—or even by escaping into an intellectual realm of timeless perfection. The reconstructionist is the radical because he would solve our problems not by conserving, or modifying, or retreating, but by future-looking. He would build a new order of civilization, under genuinely PUBLIC control, dedicated to the fulfillment of the natural values for which humanity has been struggling, consciously or unconsciously, for many centuries.[1]

Perennialism (regressivism) and essentialism (conservatism) will not be analyzed in this article. Brameld's concept of progressivism (liberalism) will be presented in brief because progressivism is assumed by Brameld to be the foundation on which reconstructionism (radicalism) is built. Also, reconstructionism can be seen more clearly against the background of what it claims not to be.

2. Progressivism

Brameld's progressivism is a large circus tent which, to me, inadequately covers many different acts. Brameld calls it a "somewhat amorphous movement."[2] Among its leaders, Brameld lists John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, Boyd Bode, Gordon Hullfish, George S. Counts, Harold Rugg and Carleton Washburne.[3] In

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[1]Theodore Brameld, *Philosophies of Education in Cultural Perspective* (Dryden Press, New York, 1955), p. 77. See also pp. 73–76.

[2]Theodore Brameld, *Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education* (Dryden Press, New York, 1956), p. 6.

[3]*Philosophies*, pp. 128–129.

past years Kilpatrick has been identified with the almost anarchistic idea of the child-centered school. Dewey, Bode and Hullfish have been identified with a pragmatism-relativism movement. Counts and Rugg have been identified with the indoctrinative teaching of the ideas of the "Frontier Thinkers," Washburne's Winnetka Plan, with its rigid, "individualized" curriculum, has been classified as being basically autocratic. Brameld seems to be grouping too many conflicting philosophies under the word progressivism. With this objection in mind, Brameld's concept of progressivism will be examined further.

> . . . Opposed to all "either-or" philosophies, [pragmatism-progressivism] tries to become, and largely succeeds as, a philosophy of "both-and." Although sensitively *opposed to any "extreme view,"* any "absolute choice," any "blueprinted future," it accepts from its inheritance the positive worth of liberty as the right to speak, think, worship, act, live as far as possible according to one's deepest personal needs. . .
>
> But it is also very important to bear in mind that the liberal temper is essentially *cautious*. The liberal approach is tolerant, sympathetic, openminded, curious about novel suggestions and new ways of acting and planning. But it is unsympathetic to dogmatic proposals, rigid tradition, arrogant authority, stubborn prejudice. The liberal is on his guard against "wrecklessness." Granting that ours is a period of inevitable change, of unique social demands, he never strays too far from the path along which our culture has been patiently moving for so long. Progress must occur in many areas, step by step, *gradually*. To edge forward a little at a time, from where we were, to where we are, toward where we might later be—testing, trying, planning, replanning, modifying, experimenting carefully—this is as essential to the liberal's mood and strategy as it is to the scientist whom, above all others, he seeks to emulate.[4]

3. BRAMELD'S OBJECTIONS TO PROGRESSIVISM

Brameld seems to disagree with Dewey's warning against a "planned society" with "fixed and final ends" and a "too extreme or militant approach to social action and social control."[5] Brameld seems to believe that progressivism-pragmatism is a philosophy representing "the transitional period of an adolescent culture."[6]

> . . . pragmatism is a philosophy in transition between the fixed universe against which it rebels and the *designed culture* which needs now to be created. . . . In short, progressivism is the educational effort of an adolescent culture, suffering from the pleasant agonies of growing up, from preoccupation with the excitement of present events, from the cultural period of trying and erring when the protections of infancy have been left behind but the planned autonomies of maturity await future delineation and fulfillment.[7]

Brameld seems to believe a mature culture would be no longer in transition. Is Brameld seeking an invincibly stable future equilibrium? This may be dangerously close to having a fixed future pattern which is to be inculcated into students. Brameld seems to believe a "strong" educational philosophy will lead us to the goals toward which to think and will be strong in conviction or commitment to "needed" positive beliefs.[8] This, to me, skirts dangerously close to indoctrination of "needed" beliefs.

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 168. Italics mine in this and other quotations.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 156.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 394.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[8] *Toward*, pp. 7–8.

According to Brameld, "Deweyism" is "too dispassionate."[9] Many followers of Dewey believe in "gradualism" and "caution against undue haste."[10] According to Brameld, education is, in their theory, a process of "endless growing" and "*feeble conviction.*"[11]

> Is not one of liberal democracy's greatest weaknesses perhaps its very pride in open-mindedness and tolerance, accompanied as they often are by *vacillation*, *uncertainty*, and *confusion*?[12]

Brameld believes progressivists do not "try to foresee too concretely what the future COULD or SHOULD be." They "neglect sustained attention to an aggressive program and comprehensive purpose for the crucial cultural period looming before us."[13] The progressivist culture is "vacillating and uncertain" and emphasizes the "compromising spirit of gradual progress."[14] Progressivism strongly opposes a "planned" society and strongly supports a "planning" society. Progressivism discourages the channeling of social change and does not decide for what people should be planning.[15]

I would ask, "Should educational philosophers decide for what people 'should' be planning?" "Is there a 'designed culture which needs now to be created,' a fixed goal toward which society should be channelled?"

4. RECONSTRUCTIONISM

> [Reconstructionism] is seeking desperately for a crystallization and fulfillment of the very ideas and powers which pragmatism-instrumentalism, evolutionism, liberalism, and many other releasing impulses set into motion as much as a hundred years ago.[16]

". . . reconstructionists have only minor differences with progressivism—AS FAR AS IT GOES."[17] Reconstructionist dissatisfaction "stems from the fear that the magnificent achievements of progressivism will not be consolidated with enough vigor and rapidity."[18]

Reconstructionism satisfies the need for crystallized purposes. It dispels vacillations and confusions chronic to our civilization. The reconstructionist would adopt "aggressive social strategies" in order to achieve a "designed world order and a planned democratic culture."[19] In reconstructionism there seems to be a "normative" pattern to adjust to.[20]

> . . . normative designs for a reconstructed culture are not to be regarded as objectives so completely established as to be *already* beyond discussion or controversy. Although they are presented as cultural policies that can and *should* be obtained by majority consensus upon the basis of values cherished by the majority . . .[21]

The normative designs are not "already" beyond discussion. Does this mean they will eventually be beyond discussion? Why "should" they be obtained by majority concensus? What would happen if the majority should never cherish reconstructionist values?

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[10] *Philosophies*, p. 193.
[11] *Toward*, p. 161.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 200.
[13] *Philosophies*, p. 188.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 199.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 196–197.
[16] *Toward*, p. 374.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 383.
[18] *Philosophies*, p. 175.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 200.
[20] *Toward*, p. 195.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

> But it should also be reiterated that one of the chief intentions of reconstructionism is to be definite rather than nebulous about the goals it proposes for our culture-in-crisis. . . . Granting again the need for continuous criticism and modification, [the goals] are designs to which the majority *should* now become committed as working models, for we believe that their validity is supported both by the values that undergird them and by cumulative evidence supplied by the natural and social sciences, the arts, and philosophy itself.[22]

People need to seek the specifiable goals "*required* by a revolutionary culture."[23] There are "*imperative* goals" of "*needed* institutions" in a reconstructed culture.[24] I would like to know who decides which goals are "required" and "imperative," and which institutions are "needed."

Reconstructionists believe in the practicability of a "planned democracy" or "mature democracy" that a "revolutionary" culture "requires."[25] In contrast, reconstructionism is "hostile to objective systems of pre-established order."[26] It is not clear to me how a "planned" or "mature" democratic order is differentiated from other democratic orders.

Are there, as Brameld believes, certain "ultimate" values we are forced to, which we "must" seek?[27] How does Brameld determine the "imperative need" to which current utopian thought is responding?[28] Reconstructionists oppose final ends, "But this doesn't mean that utopian designs don't deserve our commitment now and during the years ahead."[29] On what basis should utopian designs deserve our commitment?

Consumer cooperatives, old-age security, and the TVA are current American examples of utopian patterns which reconstructionists would applaud.[30]

> First, if we agree that man is a goal-seeker, we have in this definition a powerful instrument by which to determine how much and why men wish to know and what most, if not all, knowledge is ultimately for.[31]

Is knowledge "ultimately" for something? How does Brameld know there are ultimates? This seems to be a shift toward the ultimates of perennialism.

According to Brameld, our culture seems to be caught in the throes of a transitional and immature culture which "*should*" be transformed by reconstruction to a "radical design," i.e., international collectivism.[32] The unstated assumption seems to be that the collectivistic culture will not be transitional. It will be settled and tranquil. Brameld seems to desire a future fixed status quo.

Perennialists and essentialists have already fixed the design of what the future culture will be. Future-centered reconstructionists seem to have already set up international collectivism as the future fixed reality. It seems to be self-evident that culture is going in that direction.[33] Brameld seems to expect that we shall all see things his way if we just look long enough at our "cultural reality." To me, Brameld seems to be committing the fallacy of the "nothing but." "Nothing

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 138.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 384.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 123.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 367.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[32] *Philosophies*, p. 78.
[33] *Toward*, p. 262.

but" Brameld's view of "cultural reality" is correct. "Nothing but" international collectivism can be right.

Brameld seems to see the design of things to come, i.e., international socialism. Like Plato's Philosopher-Kings, reconstructionists seem already to know exactly where we "should" be going. Since it is already known where we should go, the next logical educational step would be to inculcate this knowledge into students. Since the "right" cultural reality is already known, why not inculcate this reality? This question logically leads us to an analysis of reconstructionist views on indoctrination.

5. INDOCTRINATION

Reconstructionists seem to stand unequivocably against indoctrination. The reconstructionist "opposes any kind of indoctrination as an educational technique."[34] "But the goals we advocate are not to be imposed or indoctrinated in any way whatever."[35] "Under no circumstances should the proposals . . . be furthered by indoctrination or superimposition, either in the school or the community."[36] Thus far, reconstructionist views on indoctrination do not seem to differ from progressivistic concepts.[37]

Brameld expressed a belief in education for "Defensible Partiality." "Reconstructionist education takes sides. . . . The reconstructionist emphasis on commitment to agreed-upon goals for the future thus once more raises the old problem of bias and indoctrination."[38]

> . . . But in philosophic terms our position, politically and economically, is parallel to our position educationally: we are teacher-citizens with convictions, with commitments, with partialities that we believe are defensible. And we mean not only to exhibit these in the public square, not only to invite completely free inspection of each conviction, but to work for their acceptance by the largest possible majority . . .[39]

To me, Brameld seems to desire to educate for partiality toward global collectivism. Would he prevent the indoctrination of beliefs partial to global collectivism?

Brameld says, ". . . the teacher can eliminate from consideration those problems that are artificial or outdated . . ."[40] To me, it is not clear to whom or by what criteria problems are "artificial" or "outdated."

Brameld seems to believe in the use of propaganda.

> . . . Reconstructionism, more forthrightly than other philosophies, with the possible exception of perennialism, believes that if education is to be a great cultural force—if it is to shape attitudes and inspire action—it should make use of the colorful and dramatic qualities possessed by propaganda.[41]

The teacher's duty includes two chief responsibilities relating to propaganda: (1) to label propaganda for what it is, meanwhile giving students practice in the detection

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 201.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 358.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[37] *Philosophies*, pp. 147–148.
[38] *Toward*, p. 200.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 338.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 180.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 204.

of its techniques; and (2) to develop, even in very young students, the clear realization that they often learn facts, rules, attitudes, and beliefs by short cuts which, although necessary at certain times, should nevertheless be investigated for their accuracy or desirability at other times.[42]

Reconstructionists seem to believe in inculcation.

Reconstructionists have never denied that fact-teaching and skill-practicing are necessary in education but such inculcation should always be geared to maximum group learning in a future-centered framework.[43]

Brameld indicates that absolutists would say indoctrination is necessary and desirable and relativists would oppose indoctrination. Brameld does not believe in relativism.[44] The implication remains that reconstructionism would be somewhere on a continuum between the extremes of indoctrinative absolutism and non-indoctrinative relativism. Reconstructionism thus seems not to be completely opposed to indoctrination.

In the early 1930's the "Frontier Thinkers" educational movement achieved recognition. The frontier thinkers were "future-centered" people who were thinking about things that "ought" to exist. It was the "frontier-thinking" teacher's task to promote loyalties to a new social order or future status quo by impressing or inculcating these loyalties into the oncoming generation. Children were to be made to like building a new social order. George S. Counts wrote a book entitled, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order*? which seemed to be consistent in thought with this movement. The Commission of the Social Studies of the American Historical Association wrote a report in 1934 which was also consistent with the frontier thinkers' philosophy. The report declared that "a new age of collectivism is emerging."

The "Frontier Thinkers" movement was criticized at that time because it seemingly would indoctrinate a future status quo. Here are Brameld's statements about George S. Counts and the Commission's report.

. . . In a polemic entitled "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?" [George S. Counts] vigorously criticized the vacillations of many progressive educators. He insisted that the schools should take sides in the struggle between reaction and reconstruction; that teachers should align themselves with those forces opposed to the old system and committed to the new . . .

In recent years, however, Counts has modified his position. He has given more attention to attacking communism and the Soviet Union than to making proposals for the reconstruction of modern culture and education. . . . On the whole, it seems fair to say of him (and of a number of others with whom he has been asociated) that, although he earlier gave significant help in the development of reconstructionism, he remains a progressivist . . .[45]

Brameld praised the "brilliant" and "forthright" 1934 report of the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association which declared: "Cumulative evidence supports the conclusion that, in the United

[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 348. See also p. 253.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 353, 356.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 159–160.

States as in other countries, the age of individualism and LAISSEZ FAIRE in economy and government is closing and that a new age of collectivism is emerging."[46]

Brameld favors the "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?" philosophy and rephrases it as "Dare the schools *RECONSTRUCT* a new social order?" This seems to be a restatement of the "Frontier-Thinkers" philosophy which was criticized in the 1930's because it would foster the indoctrination of a future status quo. To me, Brameld seems to be inconsistent when he says that "reconstructionism opposes any kind of indoctrination."

6. DEMOCRACY

Brameld presents progressivist definitions of democracy which are similar to John Dewey's statements that the democratic ideal points toward shared common interests and free and continuous readjustment and interaction between groups.[47] Brameld believes that progressivism has not progressed beyond Dewey's conceptions in *Democracy and Education*.[48] I could agree with Brameld that Dewey's statements about democracy are now inadequate. What definition of democracy does Brameld offer?

Democracy does not seem to be of central significance in reconstructionism because few statements on democracy were found in Brameld's books. Reconstructionists are committed to a "designed world-wide democracy."[49] Apparently this democracy is world-wide collectivism. Several times Brameld mentioned a "radically" democratic program. No indication was found that this program is anything other than a program of international socialism. Brameld's supreme test of democracy seems to be whether or not a culture is socialistic.

> Control by the largest possible majority of the principal institutions and resources of any culture is the supreme test of democracy . . . the working people should control all principal institutions and resources if the world is to become genuinely democratic.[50]

I could agree with Brameld that the progressivist definition of democracy is too broad and hazy. There certainly seem to be shared common interests and free and continuous readjustments and interactions between groups in countries which are not generally accepted as being democratic. However, Brameld's reconstructionist definition of democracy seems to confuse democratic governmental decision-making processes with an economic system, socialism. To me, socialism could be accepted and perpetuated by both democratic and autocratic governmental decision-making processes.

I would say the most adequate criteria I have found for determining which socio-governmental decision-making processes are democratic are that there must be (1) equality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and (2) equality of responsibility for carrying them out. An autocratic process has inequality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and inequality of responsibility for carrying them out.

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[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 163–164.
[47] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), pp. 100–101.
[48] Brameld, *Toward*, p. vi.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 354.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp 328–329.

A third governmental process alternative would be anarchy, a state of complete liberty and freedom where there are no governmental processes.

Economic systems are one type of product or decision which may be arrived at either through democratic or autocratic processes. For example, forms of both collectivism and capitalism can be accepted and employed by either democratic or autocratic nations.[51]

Brameld seemed to indicate that persuasion is democratic and that coercion is autocratic.[52] However, to me, it is consistent with democratic procedures for minorities to be coerced into obeying majority decisions. Allowing minorities to do as they please tends toward anarchy, not democracy.

The democratic process does not insure that wise decisions will be made. Decisions will only be as wise as the majorities which make the decisions. Brameld would like to have decisions accepted which he takes to be "wise." I believe that he would like to move toward a collectivistic utopia faster than people apparently have decided to go. Brameld seems to want more certainty as to the design of the future than is offered by the sometimes faltering and cautious democratic method of arriving at decisions. Distrust of the democratic decision-making abilities of the masses seems to have crept into reconstructionism.

Brameld seems not to grasp the idea of "progressive reconstruction of experience." He seems to want to jump immediately from the present into a globally collectivistic future. Brameld seems to be objecting to the "gradualism," "vacillation" and "uncertainty" of the democratic process. But, to me, his choice of processes would tend toward a radical revolution, and this seems to have autocratic overtones. One of the weaknesses of the democratic method, from an autocratic point of view, is that future results or decisions of the democratic process often cannot be forecast with certainty.

Since forecasts of the future seem not to be absolutely certain, it is important, in our rapidly changing world, to emphasize methods of dealing with the problems that face us. Future problems may make presently predicted solutions obsolete. Instead of prescribing a set future pattern of global collectivism, it might be wise to stress progressive reconstruction of experience by continuously utilizing the best presently available methods of solving problems. At the present time, the modern scientific-reflective method seems to me to be the best problem-solving method.

7. THE SCIENTIFIC-REFLECTIVE METHOD

Brameld emphasized the point of reconstructionism being future-centered. Perennialism and essentialism are also future-centered in the reconstructionist pattern because they also have already determined what the design of the future "*should*" be.

The scientific-reflective method is also future-centered, but in a different way. As John Dewey said, ". . . we live not in a settled and finished world, but

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[51]See H. Clay Jent, "A Study of the Meaning of Democracy and of its Salient Implications for Teaching," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Kansas, 1952. See also Ernest E. Bayles, "Education for Democracy," *Kansas Studies in Education*, 8: 2, May, 1958.

[52]Brameld, *Toward*, p. 381.

in one which is going on, and where our main task is prospective . . ."[53] The scientific-reflective method emphasizes looking toward possible future consequences of present actions. The scientific-reflective method may be summarized like this:

1. A problem or difficulty is sensed.
2. Hypotheses are formulated.
3. Consequences or implications of the hypotheses are deduced.
4. Implications are tested, results are observed and a conclusion is made.

This method is future-centered because hypotheses are projected into future plans of action. Hypotheses are vehicles for anticipating possible future solutions. Reflection makes it possible to act with a future goal in view. Reflection is suspenseful. It invades the unknown. In contrast, reconstructionists, essentialists, and perennialists already know what the future "should" be.

Brameld indicates that "science is inductive."[54] The Newtonian method of gathering the facts by observational methods could be characterized as inductive, but the modern scientific-reflective method is an inductive-deductive one. It has its inductive phase in the gathering of facts or data and is deductive in the deducing of possible implications and courses of action from previous hypotheses.

Brameld would determine truth by "what works" and also by group consensus.[55] "What works" seems to me to be too nebulous a concept. This concept even has been used as a justification for calling Hitler's dictatorial methods truthful; they worked. Group consensus also may not always be in harmony with what is taken to be true. By consensus, the world for many years was accepted as flat. I would not determine truth by consensus. I believe, however, that governmental decisions should be arrived at through majority consensus. To me, consensus is a basis for group action, not a basis for determination of truth. My test of the truthfulness of an idea would be whether the idea or proposition predicts what it is claimed to predict. This is the test of anticipatory accuracy of an idea.

I would insist on making clear distinctions between governmental methods, economic systems, and truth. To me, reconstructionists tend to confuse all three.

8. CONCLUSION

I can agree with Professor Brameld on one point. I believe in international collectivism. From my present limited frame of reference, some forms of collectivism seem to be the "best" of the presently available economic alternatives. I say "best" because I believe that "collectivism"can provide the greatest satisfaction and security for the greatest number of people. However, I have basic beliefs in the value of democratic procedures in politics and in the classroom. I believe there are basic dangers involved in indoctrination. Therefore, I can not accept reconstructionism because it seems to be indoctrinative and to be based upon inadequate concepts of democracy and the scientific method.

Since it could be charged that my selection of quotations might give an inadequate and inaccurate picture of the philosophy of reconstructionism, I would recommend a careful analysis of these readable and challenging books.

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[53] Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[54] Brameld, *Philosophies*, p. 147.
[55] *Toward*, pp. 92–93, 96, 349.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHER

BY GEORGE L. NEWSOME, JR.

CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN BY EDUCATORS, EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHERS, AND PHILOSOPHERS TO A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION." Writers of texts on the subject, teachers of educational philosophy and related studies, and philosophers have all sought to define philosophy of education, state its peculiar aims, subject matter, scope, and the like, or to advocate in its place some autonomous discipline of education. Indeed, the numerous articles dealing with some phase of this problem which have appeared in *Educational Theory* in the past five years indicate the concern shown by educational theorists for the problem. The fifty-fourth yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education entitled *Modern Philosophies and Education* reveals the interest of professional teachers of philosophy for educational philosophy. More recently papers presented at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association December 27, 1955 by Professors Harry S. Broudy and Kingsley Price[1] posed the problem of educational philosophy for more direct consideration by philosophers. The spring issue of the *Harvard Educational Review* followed up this issue by a symposium on the aims and content of philosophy of education.

Needless to say, various conceptions of educational philosophy which can be found in these many sources show that philosophy and educational philosophy can be, and in fact have been, defined in different ways. Philosophers, who have not yet defined their own discipline except to their own personal satisfaction, nevertheless, do not hesitate to try to define educational philosophy. This situation, however, is probably to be expected and, on the whole, might prove valuable in that it might highlight areas of agreement and disagreement and bring forth new and valuable ideas.

Philosophy of education, no doubt, has something to do with philosophy, since the term "philosophy" is used. Philosophers, as we know, have not yet reached agreement upon a definition of philosophy. Such statements as "philosophy is an attempt to comprehend reality," "philosophy is an attempt to rationalize experience," or "philosophy is an attempt to see reality steadily and see it whole" all depend upon what one means by "reality," "experience," or "wholeness." Similarly, attempts to define philosophy in terms of its subject matter have failed. Philosophers select their own subject matter and treat it as they see fit. Philosophers, it seems, hold different opinions regarding the particular characteristics of philosophy as a branch of knowledge, although they seem generally to agree that it is not a special form of activity apart from human problems.[2] In short, about all that philosophers can agree upon concerning

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[1]See, H. S. Broudy, "How Philosophical can Philosophy of Education Be?" *Journal of Philosophy*, LII (Oct. 27, 1955), 612–622; and Kingsley Price, "Is a Philosophy of Education Necessary?" *Journal of Philosophy*, LII (October 27, 1955), 622–633.

[2]UNESCO, *The Teaching of Philosophy: an International Inquiry*, p. 185.

philosophy as a discipline is that it has something to do with the problems of men. Educational philosophers might possibly reach a similar agreement concerning educational philosophy.

Educational philosophy, no doubt, pertains to education. Education, like philosophy, is a term that is difficult to define. It can be defined in many ways, from the narrowness of formal schooling to the generality of life. The indications are that philosophers and educators have not yet come to any very general agreement upon a definition of education.

If definitions of philosophy and of education can not generally be arrived at, then any attempt to define philosophy of education in terms of them is hopeless. Even if definitions of philosophy and of education were established it seems doubtful that philosophy of education could be defined by mechanical linking of the two definitions with an "and" or "of." Such a mechanical linkage would presuppose two separate subject matters, two fields of endeavor, two sets of problems, and the like. Secondly, it is presupposed that two such fields linked together would give the field of educational philosophy in which the educational philosopher finds the problems of his concern. It is highly doubtful that this is actually the case. The idea of defining educational philosophy in terms of a definition of philosophy on one hand and a definition of education on the other is a gross oversimplification of the problem.

COMMON APPROACHES TO DEFINING EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

How can the problem be effectively approached? First, let us look at several alternative approaches. Some of the more common approaches may be classified as follows:

1. Regard educational philosophy as a point of view toward education.
2. Regard educational philosophy as the application of philosophy to education.
3. Regard philosophy as the generalized theory of education.

Under each of these generalized classifications there are various differences that should be noted, especially in the case of the second classification.

The first approach to educational philosophy seems to range from the common sense notions of "practical" schoolmen to systematic philosophies. Sometimes one hears or reads statements about educational philosophy that suggest that it is more or less one's own personal outlook and uncritical beliefs about education. For example, an elementary school principal expressed her philosophy of education by singing a little song called "Let's all Get Together." One often hears such expressions as "my philosophy of audio-visual aids is . . . ," or "my philosophy of lunchroom management . . . ," and the like which also suggest common sense notions.

In a similar manner one frequently encounters ideas concerning educational philosophy which suggest that people are by nature idealistic, realistic, and the like. These natural inclinations, however, need to be developed by formal study of "rival and conflicting" systems of philosophy. Such formal study will enable one, it is implied, to find their "philosophical home" and enable them better to formulate a "philosophy of life." Educational philosophy, then, becomes a study of philosophical systems in connection with education. Most of those texts in educational philosophy which set forth system by system such classical positions

as idealism, realism, and the like seem to make these assumptions and imply this view of educational philosophy.[3]

The second approach to educational philosophy is probably the most common approach of all. The idea of applying philosophy to education does not mean that there is agreement as to how philosophy is to be applied, nor what is to be applied. Philosophy might be applied by applying the answers philosophers have given to various questions that might be of concern to education. Philosophy might also be applied to education by utilizing the methods, tools, techniques, and such of philosophy in investigating problems of formal schooling.[4] Philosophy can be applied to education in yet another way. One might utilize "world frames," systems of philosophy, and the like to explain or interpret education.[5] Finally, one can apply philosophy to education by deducing educational implications from systematic philosophies.[6]

The view that educational philosophy is an applied discipline in the sense that it is the application of "unique theoretical tools" to problems of formal schooling[7] warrants further consideration. This view was apparently one that emerged from efforts of educational philosophers to make their field of study academically respectable. They, no doubt, wished to show that it possessed a "distinctive nature," and this distinctiveness was found in the "unique theoretical tools" employed and in what the philosophy was *of*. The theoretical tools named in the report of the committee could hardly be called unique to philosophy of education, nor for that matter even to philosophy. Sciences both natural and social utilize hypotheses, concepts and categories, and ideas of meaning, truth, value and method which were termed "unique theoretical tools." They also employ these tools in much the same manner as the report suggested. The idea of defining a field of study or work in terms of "unique tools" falls short of expectations. Carpentry, plumbing, auto mechanics, or any other activity can not be defined in terms of its tools alone. The artisan must also be considered. The committee, however, refused to consider the person using the tools. If they employed a person alleged to be a carpenter on this basis, they might be most disappointed in the results of his work, even though it is often recognized that a workman can be judged by the *condition* of his tools. Finally, in limiting educational philosophy to problems of formal schooling, the committee seems to have sawed off the limb that they were sitting on. How can one effectively deal with problems of education in isolation from the other activities of life?

The third approach to educational philosophy is probably one that has not received much attention. As Professor Axtelle has said, ". . . Dewey's conception of philosophy as the general theory of education is not only one of his most pro-

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[3]For example, see, Rupert C. Lodge, *Philosophy of Education* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 1; and John T. Wahlquist, *The Philosophy of American Education* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1942) p. 12.

[4]"The Distinctive Nature of the Discipline of Philosophy of Education," *Educational Theory*, January, 1954, p. 1.

[5]For example, see, The National Society For the Study of Education, Forty-First Yearbook, Part I, *Philosophies of Education*.

[6]For example, James N. Brown, *Educational Implications of Four Conceptions of Human Nature* (The Catholic University of America Press, 1940).

[7]This is the view represented in a statement by a committee of the Philosophy of Education Society, "The Distinctive Nature of the Discipline of the Philosophy of Education," *Educational Theory* (4: 1–3) January, 1954.

found insights, but one of the most profound insights in the history of thought."[8] The insight, however, does not seem to have occurred to very many educators and educational philosophers. Indeed, it might well have never been evident to any except Dewey himself. Just what does this insight mean? What is implied in the idea that philosophy is the generalized theory of education?

Dewey thought that philosophy might be described in terms of the problems of social life;[9] that it *could not* be defined in terms of subject matter;[10] that it was reflective thinking which had generalized its place, value, and function in experience;[11] and that it was the general theory of education.[12] Such reflective thinking, however, required freedom to think and to inquire with no prior guarantee of the outcomes. He said:[13]

> *Freedom* of thought denotes freedom of thinking; specific doubting, inquiring, suspense, creating and cultivating of tentative hypotheses, trials or experimentatings that are unguaranteed and that involve risks of waste, loss, and error. Let us admit the case of the conservative; if we once start thinking no one can guarantee where we shall come out, except that many objects, ends, and institutions are surely doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place.

Dewey also thought that philosophy was not concerned with furnishing solutions to so-called practical and immediate problems, but rather in locating significant problems and devising methods for dealing with them, or as he stated it:[14]

> Philosophy is thinking what the known demands of us—what responsive attitude it exacts. It is an idea of what is possible, not a record of accomplished fact. Hence it is hypothetical, like all thinking. It presents an assignment of something to be done—something to be tried. Its value lies not in furnishing solutions (which can be achieved only in action) but in defining difficulties and suggesting methods for dealing with them.

The fact that philosophy was hypothetical in character did not lead Dewey, however, to think that it was in any way a special discipline, or that it was in any way unrelated to the world of men and things. In fact, he urged that:[15]

> Unless philosophy is to remain symbolic—or verbal—or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct.

All of these conceptions of educational philosophy suggest a role for the educational philosopher. That is, the way in which one conceives of educational philosophy indicates the functions of the educational philosopher. If educational philosophy be thought of as a common sense view of education, then the educational philosopher functions at the common sense level. If educational philosophy is the study of "conflicting philosophies" or systems with a view of helping students find a comfortable philosophical home, then the educational philosopher is concerned with demonstrating conflicting systems and guiding students into consoling

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[8]George E. Axtelle, "Philosophy in American Education," *Harvard Educational Review* (26: 184–189, Spring, 1956), p. 187.
[9]John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 378.
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 379.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 381.
[12]*Ibid.*, p. 383.
[13]John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 222.
[14]John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 381.
[15]*Ibid.*, p. 383.

and personally satisfying positions. Where educational philosophy is conceived as an applied discipline, the educational philosopher is half philosopher and half educator whose chief function is to take what philosophy may give him and apply it as he can to education. The chances are that he is not a philosopher in his own right, but rather one who borrows from philosophy. As a borrower he borrows ideas, conceptual tools, methods, and the like from philosophy, or he borrows systems which might be milked for educational implications. When the educational philosopher becomes a borrower he is expected to return what he borrows, and, in some cases, pay interest on the loan as well. In any case, the borrower is servant to the lender. On the other hand, if philosophy is viewed as the general theory of education, the educational philosopher must be a philosopher in his own right.

THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHER AS A PHILOSOPHER

What does it mean to say that the educational philosopher should be a philosopher in his own right? First of all, it does not mean that he has to be a teacher of those studies usually found in philosophy departments, nor that he has to be a member of group, faculty, or department labelled "philosophy." It does mean, however, that he must engage in philosophical activity, exercise the functions of a philosopher, and think and act philosophically. To do these things, he must think reflectively, think freely, doubt, inquire, cultivate hypotheses, infer consequences, think what the known demands, analyze, synthesize, and project ideas. Secondly, to be a philosopher does not mean that such thinking need be done apart from education, nor that it be restricted to education. The philosopher does not just think, he must think about something. What he thinks about are problems of men, what the known objects and events of life demand, what seems possible; in short, human experience and nature. Education, then, if it be life, or related to life, must be a concern of the philosopher. The philosopher can not effectively deal with education alone, however, for he can not treat education separately from the rest of experience. In short, he can not explain education merely in terms of education.

Were educational philosophers more concerned with defining philosophy in terms of philosophizing instead of in terms of distinctiveness of knowledge, their efforts might be more fruitful. The first two views of philosophy of education have notable shortcomings. They either fall into the trap of common sense or lead to what Sidney Hook called the "garulous absurdities" of supposing that an educational philosophy might be deduced from some systematic cosomology.[16] Let it be admitted that such educational philosophies can, and have, been deduced, but to suppose that they are more than symbolic and verbal is yet to be seen. It might be well to ask such philosophers how they know what they are doing.[17] Both of the first two views of educational philosophy seem to tend toward the formation of what has been termed useless theories of education. Foster McMurray has said:[18]

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[16]Sidney Hook, "The Scope of Philosophy of Education," *Harvard Educational Review* (26: 145–148) Spring, 1956, p. 148.

[17]For example, see, Otto Krash, "How Do Philosophers Know What They are Doing," *Educational Theory* (5: 167–171, July, 1955). Krash suggests that failure to accept the principles of change and continuity leads to dogmatism and *a priori* reasoning. Are philosophers doing this when they seek to deduce educational theories from fixed systems?

[18]Foster McMurray, "Preface to an Autonomous Discipline of Education," *Educational Theory* (5: 129–140, July, 1955), p. 131.

> While educational philosophers engage at second hand controversies of systematic philosophy and in finding implications for education, practical educators with no training in theory proceed with their own task of constructing and changing school programs.

Unfortunately for educational philosophers who hold the first two positions concerning educational philosophy, McMurray's statement can not be easily dismissed, nor well refuted in the light of factual evidence.

The alternative to the present dilemma is to stop thinking of educational philosophy as a self-contained discipline and begin to show concern for the functions of educational philosophers as philosophers. Disciplines suggest disciples, not philosophers. What can educational philosophy offer in this age of anxiety, conservatism, and transition? Could the answer be philosophical thinking rather than stories about philosophies, and ghosts from the philosophical cemetery? The challenge of philosophy seems to be to press forward, not regress; to philosophize, not merely talk about philosophy; and to seek to make students philosophers, not merely disciples. It is not the mission of philosophy to console the timid and fainthearted, nor to defend vested interests, nor to publicize current practice. The aim of philosophy is criticism and vision, not complacency and hindsight. The means are critical and reflective thinking. The instrument is the educational philosopher upon whom so much depends.

If this conception of educational philosophy were accepted, the educational philosopher might come to feel less like a second-hand dealer in philosophy operating a shabby establishment on the lower end of academic avenue. Instead, he might come to think of himself as a philosopher and educator, a critic of the total culture, and as a thinker capable of developing new alternatives to present problems. He would not need to limit his activities to problems of institutions labelled schools. The school and its problems would be viewed in the total life situation of our times. The educational philosopher would not allow any subject matter boundary lines to prevent him from examining issues that were of living significance, for such issues could not be foreign to education formal or informal.

Although educational philosophers do not seem to have taken so radical and comprehensive a view of their field of scholarship, there now seem to be indications that a growing number of them are working in this direction. For example, Myron Leiberman (*Education As A Profession*) and L. G. Thomas (*The Occupational Structure and Education*) indicate that educational philosophers are bringing philosophy to bear upon real problems that heretofore have been outside the customary domain of educational philosophy. Theodore Brameld, in seeking to develop a reconstructed philosophy of education, has drawn upon many fields of scholarship and dealt with a number of pressing problems. Recent periodical literature also seems to reveal that there are a growing number of philosophers in education who are philosophizing about real and pressing social and educational problems. Finally, the quality of recent philosophizing in education seems to be of a high order. These trends point to the maturing of educational philosophy as a significant field of scholarship.

With the maturing of educational philosophy it might be expected that philosophers will give more attention to their own activity. They are likely to become more critical of what they do when they philosophize, and also more concerned about their role as philosophers. In so doing, they might become more

concerned with the *how* of philosophizing and theory building. Just how do philosophers philosophize and build theories? Educational philosophers seek also to explain education. Explaining is one of the chief tasks of the philosopher; it is the foundation of his theories, or probably what his theories are designed to do. Questions of how philosophers explain and theorize raise questions concerning the use of categories, and classification, language form, definition, models, logic of inquiry and explanation, and ideas of systematic methods of explaining such as concepts of description and causation. More careful inquiry into questions of this sort might well help educational philosophers explain education in a more effective manner, and help them to build theories that can not be labelled "useless." Such inquiry might also help overcome a situation which has been described as follows:[19]

> The need for perspective and direction in such a critical area as education is plainly evident and to this end the discipline of history and philosophy of education can make increasingly significant contributions. One must add, however, that rigorous and scholarly research of high excellence in the discipline is conspicuously lacking. . . . There is great assiduity in accumulating knowledge about things educational, but disconcerting lack of systematic, integrating theory which would give meaning and significance to our efforts. . . . The fragmentary and ragbag character of a great deal of current educational research indicates slight evidence of the construction of such a theoretical framework.

[19]Frederick E. Ellis, "Historical and Philosophical Aspects of Education," *Review of Educational Research* (25: 5–11, February, 1955), pp. 5–6.

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LEVELS OF CREATIVITY

BY LOUIS A. FLIEGLER

Shaping-re-shaping
The eternal spirits eternal pastime[1]

MAN IS PROBABLY THE MOST CREATIVE ANIMAL EXTANT ON EARTH. His creativity becomes uniquely distinctive when it is recognized that he is consistently altering his environment to discover new concepts and inventing devices, thereby furthering his vista about the universe. This constant search for answers and change conceivably may be a basic urge for man to discover his place in the world around him. The impenetrable becomes permeable and the ultimate unknown only exists in theory but not in fact.

It seems perplexing that such inner compulsion on the part of man has not elicited an abundance of psychological information which might attempt to explain the phenomenon of creativity. The problem is an age-old one; yet only sparse experimental evidence has been accumulated to suggest possible explanations as to the intrinsic motivations and processes which propel individuals to creative acts. In examining the Psychological Abstracts, Guilford notes, "Of approximately 121,000 titles listed in the past 23 years, only 186 were indexed as definitely bearing on the subject of creativity. . . . In other words, less than two-tenths of one per cent of the books and articles indexed in the abstracts for approximately the past quarter-century bear directly on this subject."[2] This paucity of exploration and investigation belies the significance of creativity. Undoubtedly, without dynamic change, man will become stagnant and ecologically corrode.

Guilford further states that some of the explicable reasons for the apparent neglect of experimental or theoretical data about creativity are:

1. A practical criterion of creativity is difficult to assess because of its rare occurrence;
2. the methodological problems that occur in present-day test construction do not measure the creative qualities of an individual;
3. research in learning has been limited to lower animals where creativity is almost nonexistent.

Certainly the logic and conclusions of Guilford's statements are plausible, but the hindrances to an inquiry into creativity seems to be "experimenter-centered." Perhaps test items and laboratories are not the most feasible means for analyzing the microscopic and macroscopic processes of creativity. A kaleidoscopic view of the world reveals a consistent strain of magnificent and brilliant developments which clearly demonstrates that creativity exists. To examine the basic elements of creativity would necessitate an analysis of developmental growth patterns, available intelligence, personality factors, and motivational aspects which fuse to culminate in a creative contribution to society. Consequently, cross-sectional

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[1]Jung, Carl F., "Psychology and Literature in the Creative Process," in Ghiselin, B., *The Creative Process* (California: University of California Press, 1952), p. 212.

[2]Guilford, J. P. "Creativity," *Amer. Psych.*, 1950, 5, 444–454.

and longitudinal investigations may offer information which might be validated experimentally. Hence, the study of creativity should commence in the classroom, home, and in the world-of-work rather than in laboratories or theoretical test items.

Too often creativity is viewed with a rarified frame of reference which only enhances an unnecessary aura of mystery. Guilford's statement that it occurs rarely is a case in point. For educational purposes, such ultra-stratospheric generalization almost places creativity far beyond the reach of teachers who attempt to activate elements of creativity. No one can produce a genuinely creative work without environmental stimulation or prior extrinsic motivation. "No matter how original or valuable a creative conception, it cannot result in a work of art (or mathematical formula or an invention) unless its originator has the requisite skills to convert it into tangible form."[3]

Another somewhat immutable obstacle to an enlightened perspective of creativity is the concern with the end-product. Although the ultimate test of a contribution is the result and permanency of effect, extensive trial and error (experimentation) has been involved before the final product takes shape. It seems naive to assume that any act is totally new to an organism and unrelated to any previous preparation. Ghiselin says, "The invention may appear spontaneously and without apparent preliminaries, sometimes in the form of a mere glimpse serving as a clue, or like a germ to be developed . . ."[4] Of course, the creative product may be so new that it transcends or is an extension beyond the current stream of life, but the spontaneity probably erupted after techniques were learned, interest in area of endeavor developed, and some previous thinking occurred specifically germane to the end-product.

To understand a process, the primary step is to establish various levels of events which occur in sequence or intervals. In addition, describing a process in gross terms unnecessarily limits interpretation of the event. For example, the concept of abstraction may serve as an illustration. In too many instances the mentally retarded are regarded as lacking abstract abilities with no attempt being made to include comparative aspects and different levels of abstraction as qualifications of the overall generalization. Specifically, and more substantially correct, would be the statement that the mentally retarded do not abstract as readily as the normal or gifted, but that they can abstract at a certain level. Therefore, it is with the purpose of pinpointing various levels of creativity that creativity can best be understood.

Creativity has inherent in its context an evolutionary and developmental perspective. Although the present thesis is concerned with ontogenic aspects, the phylogenetic determinants are inherent and part of the dynamics in the evolutionary growth of creativity. The inclusion of this latter concept is only made to emphasize a neglected phase of creativity.

The use of the pyramid rather than a circle or rectangle to depict a conceptual model is a rather interesting device. It attempts to show cumulative effects of concepts where the specific aspects are not equal in difficulty but are interrelated in building more inclusive constructs. The need to demonstrate interrelationships

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[3]Vinacke, E. W. *The Psychology of Thinking* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952).
[4]Ghiselin, B. *The Creative Process, op. cit.*



and the continual sifting of experience between the various stages is illustrated by the apertures in the pyramid.

This schematic representation is an attempt to project a pyramidal structure of differential levels of creativity. The base of the pyramid may be referred to as simple habit creativity. It is the most elementaristic and fundamental aspect of an individual's growth patterns. In a sense the initial evidences of creativity are apparent at this level. "Although very little is, in actuality, known about this aspect (developmental aspects), it is of great importance for an understanding of creativity. At present more is known about the measurement of creative ability, and about mental growth generally, than about creativity and conditions which promote it."[3] Included at this level may be such variety of tasks as grasping an object, opening a door, standing upright, etc. True, the complexities involved in the various activities are not similar, but the common theme would still be a one to one relationship between an individual and his environment with limitation of decisions which are essential to execute the act. The point of creation in simple habit creativity would be the first time the organism responds correctly to the simple reaction pattern since the individual does not possess the accurate learning pattern until that moment of success. Of course, as soon as the trace pattern is reinforced it becomes a simple habit formation. However, the original successful act should not be summarily dismissed because future creative hierarchial sequences develop from these seemingly simple executions.

[3]Ghiselin, B., *The Creative Process*, *op. cit.*

A further step up the pyramid is simple selective creativity which involves the utilization of two stimuli in the environment to make a choice. The primary distinction between simple habit creativity and simple selective creativity is made on the basis of the number of stimuli placed within the individual's environment. The striking of a match to create fire is an example of simple selective creativity. The one to one relationship continues to exist but another activity emerges. It is important to note that the first occasion when man discovered fire would be considered projected creativity. The need for more advanced relational thinking becomes apparent although the individual is making an association at an elementary level. It is at this level that interest and evaluation become more prominent in producing a creative act.

As more stimuli are placed within the environment, complex selective creativity becomes evident. The decisions which need to be made are manifold and represent more than merely a correct response. The self becomes uniquely individual and some aspects of commonality tend to diminish. A higher degree of interpretation and associational activity elicits differential patterns which individualize reactions. Realistically, many steps probably evolve between simple selective creativity and complex selective creativity, but at this stage of theoretical development the general classifications serve as a basis for future thinking.

The core of the first three levels remains constant. The individual functions in his environment by utilizing those properties which are necessary for life, but does not combine the various elements to extend present knowledge to new horizons. If creativity stopped at this point, no change or advance in civilization would occur.

The prevailing frame of reference for what is conceived by many writers to be creativity is, in essence, two aspects of the creative process—problem solving creativity and projected creativity. Both of these levels are highly interrelated, but they are different in abstractness.

Problem solving creativity is designated as the efficaciousness of an individual to integrate diverse observable elements in the environment to create a new end-product. In differentiating between complex selective creativity and problem solving creativity, the former does not involve a unique application and a new end-product of current information, whereas the latter does. At this point, the functional applications of science are more in evidence than at the lower or upper levels. Problem solving creativity is the initial effort of an individual to synthesize and extend observable elements which he has inwardly conceptualized.

Projected creativity represents a still higher form of creativity. It is evidenced in the utilization of abstract knowledge (mathematics) to predict an event, or the production of an art piece of unusual magnitude and conception which has been created from the artist's imagination, or the composition of a symphony. Discoveries, some inventions, and theories, although representing different mental qualities are also included at this level. These illustrations are somewhat different in integration and elaboration of design, but though the specific techniques are dissimilar the processes which create the knowable from the unknowable are analogous. Imagination, conceptualized analyses and syntheses, and problem solving ability play a significant role in effecting projected creativity.

Before proceeding with the two upper levels of creativity, it would be important to define creativity as it is conceived within the restrictions of feasible experimental

(*Continued on page 115*)

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF PLATO'S AND DEWEY'S EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

BY JOHN MILTON SMITH

Introduction

THE INTIMATE RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED OR DENIED. Some educators do not believe that a course in philosophy of education is needed or desirable. Others go so far as to argue that a course in philosophy of education is not possible. How can one, they ask, teach a philosophy of education before the meaning of education has been determined? Does not this question suggest the need for philosophy? It is not a problem of philosophy to interpret our educational efforts, to bring meaning out of chaos and confusion?

Historically, the union of philosophy and education dates back at least to Plato's *Republic*. In the *Republic* we find our first great treatise on a philosophy of education. Here, education is presented as both an individual and social affair. The individual is conceived as containing within himself all of the characteristics that are writ large in the State. Social philosophy is, therefore, intimately bound up with the philosophy of the individual. Indeed, man has no meaning or existence apart from the state. For Plato, as for Aristotle, man was by nature a social and political animal. Apart from social intercourse he could be only a God or a beast.

The social conditions that called forth Plato's educational philosophy bear a close analogy to the problems that Dewey has to face. In both Plato's and Dewey's time society was undergoing a rapid process of change. The old customs, traditions, and mores were giving way to new ones. As the old order was passing away it became increasingly important to discover a framework for the interpretation of the temporal flux. Both of them sought their framework in a redefinition of reality. Their different conceptions of reality led them to different views of the nature, aims, and methods of education.

For Plato reality was eternal, immutable, and unchanging. It was in terms of this metaphysics that he advocated controls. That is, his purpose of controlling change was to realize a state of affairs where there would be a minimum of further change. Change to Plato signified imperfection and incompleteness.

Dewey, on the other hand, conceived of reality not as eternal, immutable, and unchanging, but a continuum of change. Consequently, Dewey, instead of opposing control to change, urged the frank acceptance of the principle of change and sought a conception of control campatible with it. Change to Dewey was not something to overcome or explain away, but something to be directed, guided, and employed intelligently.

Obviously these two philosophies imply different concepts of the good life and how it is to be reached. An examination of Plato's philosophical system as

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it pertains to education will reveal, when compared with Dewey's educational philosophy, points of view that may provide a broader perspective in formulating our own philosophy of education.

THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

As much as Plato's and Dewey's educational philosophies seem to have in common, their philosophical bases are diametrically opposite. Many statements made by Plato and Dewey might be interchanged without explanatory references. However, a comparison of isolated statements (as so often done) fails to sound the depths of fundamental likenesses and differences between the two educational systems. Only by a study of their metaphysical assumptions can their basic differences in educational practices be understood. The possibility of such an understanding seems, at first sight, to be precluded by Dewey's renunciation of metaphysics. He says:

> It is often said that pragmatism, unless it is content to be a contribution to mere methodology, must develop a theory of Reality. But the chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality in general, *uberhaupt*, is possible or needed. It occupies the position of an emancipated empiricism or a thoroughgoing naive realism. It finds that "reality" is a denotative term, a word used to designate indifferently everything that happens.[1]

His denial of a theory of Reality (metaphysics) is a denial of those theories that make some particular aspect of reality *the* Reality underlying a diversity of realities. Since such an entity as *the* Reality cannot be experienced, but can only be speculated about, he is content to found his philosophy of education upon a "naturalistic metaphysics."[2] Metaphysics in this context is "a statement of the generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds without regard to their differentiation into physical and mental" and as such, metaphysics is "a groundmap of the province of criticism."[3] Rather than deny the value of a metaphysics, as Childs[4] supposes, Dewey affirms:

> The more sure one is that the world which encompasses human life is of such and such a character (no matter what his definition), the more one is committed to try to direct the conduct of life, that of others as well as of himself, upon the basis of the character assigned to the world.[5]

The truth is, Dewey does have a theory of *reality*, or a world-view, which he opposes to absolute idealism's theory of Reality as represented, for instance, by Plato.

The character of the world as Plato conceived it was a world divided into two parts, namely, the world of reality and the world of appearance, or in other words, the world of being and the world of becoming. The characteristic traits of the world of being were the eternal, immutable, and unchanging Forms, while the distinctive marks of the world of becoming, were the temporal, divisible, and changing particulars of everyday experience. Whatever degree of reality there was in the world of particulars was due to a certain "participation in" or "partaking of" the universal in the particular or the particular in the universal. Thus,

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[1] *Creative Intelligence*, p. 35.
[2] Cf. *Experience and Nature*, Chap. 11, esp. pp. 47–48, 68–69.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 412, 413.
[4] *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism*, pp. 42–49.
[5] *Experience and Nature*, pp. 413–414.

the visible universe exhibits a degree of uniform and eternal law, and a degree of irregularity and change. In the absence of such interaction, the world of particulars became a copy or a reflection of the world of Forms. The value of sense experience as compared with reflective thinking was correspondingly diminished. The world of becoming was in a continuous state of flux. In such a world existence was uncertain and knowledge of reality was impossible. Accordingly, the world of becoming was characterized by a lower form of knowledge (opinion), since all stages of knowledge represented some level of being. Thus, the world of becoming, in contrast with the world of being, was merely a lower degree of reality in that it was not wholly actualized. The two characteristic traits of knowledge were its infallibility and its having something real for its object. Therefore, knowledge, according to Plato, could only have as its object a world characterized by eternity and permanency, orderliness and unity (in variety), completeness and rationality, perfection and harmony. His reality was a smugly closed system that excluded chance, change, and contingency. It was a wholly unprecarious reality.

The character of the world as Dewey conceives it is in direct opposition to Plato's theory of reality. According to Dewey, we live in a world in which "natural existence is qualitatively individualized or genuinely plural, as well as repetitious" and in which "things have both temporal quality and recurrence and uniformity."[6] The natural world is the only world known to experience. It is a world characterized by change and stability, order and disorder, continuity and discontinuity, unity and diversity, contingency and law. In this world there is a mixture of the hazardous and problematic with the certain and dependable. The fact that nature is not finished, complete, stable, and is wholly unprecarious makes the world a fit place for human endeavor. "The striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort."[7] For, according to Dewey, every existence is an event. That is to say, every existence has its own distinctive qualities, and a definite beginning and ending in time and place. The events themselves are transitory but the symbolic constructs that express the ratio, or the relation between events, are constant.[8]

A world that is wholly risky is just as offensive to Dewey as a world that is wholly certain. In the former, there could be no necessity. Consequently, it would mark a state of affairs where there was no real connection between events, and no real meanings. In the latter, there could be no meanings because such a world would denote a state of affairs where needs, efforts, and satisfactions would be miracles.[9] Doubt, ignorance, error, and the need for inference and inquiry would not have a place in a finished, complete, and fixed world. The instrumental character of mind as a method of directing natural changes would be meaningless. Modern science would be impossible. But where change and stability, order and disorder, and the like obtain, there is the need for science to extract the uniform occurrences of nature in the interest of prediction and control.

If metaphysics is "the ground-map of the province of criticism," then it may be possible for us to find our way to the basic assumptions that account for some of the differences and likenesses in contemporary educational practice. One of the first problems that confronts the educator is what the role of the school should be in a world of social change. How is change to be interpreted? The way that

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[6] *Experience and Nature*, p. 160.
[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 50.
[8] Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 70–72, 146–9.
[9] Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 64 f.

the educator addresses himself to this problem will depend, overtly or covertly, upon his frame of reference as to the nature of reality. If reality is conceived as perfect, eternal, complete, and fixed as Plato thought, then change, as the conversion of the soul denotes a movement from the imperfect to the perfect, from opinion to knowledge. Accordingly, learning is relegated to a lower order of reality, that is, to becoming and change. Reflective inquiry has as its purpose the discovery of a pre-existent, infallible, and stable subject matter. The method of science, being bound to a fixed scheme of ends, will consist of definition and classification, or demonstration of this subject matter. Investigation will be concerned with filling in the gaps of an antecedent ready-made hierarchy of Forms. Discovery and learning will be concerned with the subsumption of the particular under its universal.[10] Once the perfection has been reached, as in the case of the philosopher-kings and the perfect society, change and consequently learning ceased. The contemplative life, with the exception of an occasional return to direct the world of affairs, was the lot for the one who had been completely educated. The role of the school consists in striving to maintain the status quo against the impact of the new social forces. Accordingly, change in plays, manners, and music will not be permitted because they will lead to changes in other institutions and laws.[11] The role of the school is to discover and transmit the eternal verities. If on the other hand, reality is not conceived as perfect, eternal, complete, and stable, but as, according to Dewey, a mixture of change and stability, of completenesses and uncertain possibilities going on to indeterminate consequences, then the essence of reality is change which conditions educational practice. It is not the fact of social change that presents the main problem of the role of the school to the educator, for as Dewey has pointed out, "the rate of change may be so slow and rhythmic as to have all the advantages of stability in dealing with some transitory and irregular happenings."[12] The main problem arises from the fact that social conditions are undergoing rapid changes in so many divergent directions as to produce social confusion and conflict. There is no evidence that these changes are directed by some cosmic intelligence toward a particular, coherent social result. Reflective inquiry is stimulated by confusion and conflict. Learning's natural habitation is the world of becoming and change. "A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event occuring *within* nature because of traits of the latter."[13] "The ultimate evidence of genuine hazard, contingency, irregularity and indeterminateness in nature is thus found in the occurrence of thinking."[14] Learning or discovery will be directed toward resolving social confusion and conflict. In opposition to the cold-storage conception of knowledge, reflective inquiry implies that the *found* rather than the *given*, is the proper subject matter of science. Knowledge is, therefore, instrumental in stimulating, guiding, and checking further inqury. The role of the school, accordingly, is not merely to reflect social changes but to take an active part in the production and direction of these changes.

Another important difference in educational practice grows out of a monistic and pluralistic conception of reality. For Plato, the ultimate reality was the Form of the Good. It was the cause of all other existences. Because of its subsistence outside of space and time, and because of its immateriality, it could not be

[10]Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 152, 153.
[11]Cf. *Rep.* 424; *Laws* 799.
[12]Cf. *Experience and Nature*, p. 71.
[13]*Op. cit.*, p. 68.
[14]*Op. cit.*, p. 69.

apprehended by the senses, but insofar as it partook of the nature of thought, it could be apprehended by finite minds. The senses were confused ideas which had to be brought under subjection to the preexisting (a priori) knowledge of the Forms. Since the Forms were eternal and complete, there was no place for the emergence of genuine novelty. Every new discovery was merely the disclosure of an antecedent reality to be fitted in the gaps of the hierarchy of Forms. Educational values were not events. Therefore, they were not subject to the gnawing tooth of time. Change belonged to a lower degree of Being. It was considered either as an appearance or as a partly unfulfilled reality. The perspective of the educator, accordingly, was not limited by the past, present, or future. A system of education founded on these assumptions has the advantages of a house founded upon a rock. It was designed to inspire great confidence. Its method of teaching and successive grades of subject matter were conditioned by the attainment of specific results.

In opposition to Plato's view that all existences are ultimately subsumed under one absolute reality, Dewey's pluralism asserts that there are more than one or two fundamental realities, as for instance, measure, ratio, relation, identity, similarity, difference, qualities, and events, in multiple combinations. These are constants for all practical purposes. "In mathematics some variables are constants in some problems; so it is in nature and life."[15] The slower, more uniform, orderly, and rhythmic events are designated structure, while the more rapid and irregular ones are process. In Dewey's philosophy process is substituted for substance. However, process implies change and the passage of time out of which genuine novelities arise as attested to by organic evolution and the physical sciences. Education is a process. It is growth or becoming. Consequently, it is existential and subject to time, place, and circumstance. The existence of real novelties implies that the future is not only uncertain and contingent but also that reality itself is not complete. The educational corollary that follows from this metaphysics is that the present is the proper time for educational endeavor. The accumulated knowledges and techniques of the past are not just objects to be appropriated for their own sakes. They are instrumental in solving present problems. The mental habits thus formed in conjoint activities have moral value. They determine human character and conduct. In this wise, the individual's past and present histories are joined together. However, on the basis of Dewey's metaphysics they need not remain together. For, if the structure as well as the process are subject to change, how can the individual maintain his identity while learning, change, and maturation are going on? To some of us it is not so consoling to know that the loss of good things, of our friends, possessions and precious selves may be compensated for by knowing that no evil will endure forever, and that the memory of the loss of those nearest and dearest to us will grow dim in time.[16]

Another basic philosophical concept that makes a difference in educational practice is the problem of "free-will" versus determinism. The metaphysical problem of free will grows out of the question whether there is or is not freedom in the ultimate nature of things. According to determinism all ostensible acts of free choice are conditioned by antecedent factors in the life of the individual.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 71.
[16] Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 71 f.

If human intelligence were without limitation it would be able to predict, on the basis of all the antecedent factors in the life of the child, the future results of present educational endeavor. On the other hand, the indeterminists in varying degrees hold that the individual is free to act from a motiveless choice or that he is free to choose among different motivations without regard to their intensity.[17]

In a world as Plato conceived it freedom of the will could hardly be other than transcendental. In *The Laws*, Plato relates in a myth how God assigned to human souls their respective places in the universe in a manner designed to insure victory of the good over evil: "But the formation of qualities (characters)," Plato says, "He left to the wills of the individuals. For everyone of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul."[18] In the myth of Er,[19] freedom of the will is connected with the doctrine of metempsychosis and retribution. Here man is represented as free to choose his own destiny (Daimon) which becomes irrevocable once the choice is made. The peril of choosing one's character which becomes one's particular destiny places a premium upon choosing wisely. The Fates send to each soul a genius to be the guardian of his life and the fulfiller of his choice. Stripped of its mythological setting and given modern form and expression in terms of education, Plato would mean that the pupil is free to choose among the stimuli that influence conduct rather than to choose freely among a "sample of lives" (Bion paradeigmata). This freedom of choice carried to its ultimate conclusion would seem to indicate that the pupil is self-educated. The pupil's freedom to accept or reject the teacher's instruction gives no assurance that learning will accompany teaching. The pupil, according to this theory, is self-active, self-directive, and self-determined. He is free to achieve self-realization. However, this does not absolve the teacher of the responsibility to exhaust all the means at his disposal in furnishing his pupils the necessary stimuli.

According to Dewey, freedom is not transcendental or God-given. Freedom is an achievement wrought out in a precarious and contingent world. In such a world marked by structure and process, the uniform and regular and the hazardous and irregular, there are variables that are combined to form unique relations and real novelties in an emergent evolution. One of these products is freedom of the will. Both the determinist and the libertarian have gone astray and have given rise to a meaningless problem by assuming that the moral self is an original datum having a separate existence from the natural order.[20] The difficulty is dissolved when man is considered continuous with nature. The problem then becomes what sort of behavior characterizes a free individual within the natural process. In the first place, preference, choice, bias, interest are referred to individuality. Individuality on the lowest level is marked by *bias*; on the highest level, by *interest*. The purpose of education from the naturalistic viewpoint is not to eliminate bias, but to make bias grow less arbitrary and more significant. Thus, the tendency of the pupil to grow, his tendency of learning to learn, is an expression of his freedom. The nature of his environment makes choice and preference possible.

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[17]For an exhaustive treatment of the problem of the freedom of the will, see McCallister, W. J., *The Growth of Freedom in Education*, (New York: Ray Long and Richard R. Smith Company, 1931).

[18]*Rep.*, 904C.

[19]*Rep.*, 613E ff.

[20]Cf. *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 9.

> "In a world which was completely tight and exact in all its constituents, there would be no room for freedom . . . Freedom is an actuality when the recognition of relations, the stable element, is combined with the uncertain element, in the knowledge which makes foresight possible and secures intentional preparation for probable consequences. We are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about."[21]

One's ability to think is what makes one free, and this capacity is traced to one's nervous system.

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[21] *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 249 f.

LEVELS OF CREATIVITY (*Continued from page 108*)

phenomena. Creativity is a process in which man manipulates external symbols or objects to produce an unusual event uncommon to himself and/or his environment. "Uncommon to himself" exemplifies the first three stages of creativity while "uncommon to his environment" illustrates projected creativity.

The final observable level is creativity which substantially is symbolic of the creation of life. It is conceivable that the inclusion of some tinges of a metaphysical concept in a conceptual model may be repugnant to a vast number of theoreticians. However, the formation of life in general is essential to a theory of creativity. Although some factors included in creativity are not within the province of duplication by man, there are myriad examples where man has contributed to unique phases of plant and lower forms of animal life. As to the creation of man himself, the problem becomes more profound and challenging. Lecomte du Nuoy has attempted mathematically to demonstrate the impossibility of the creation of man by the laws of probability; new discoveries may demonstrate just the reverse. Perhaps the possibility that life can be created in a test tube is not too far distant. Whether life in a test tube may finally culminate in a human being fosters some interesting speculation.

The apex of the pyramid is open to allow for additional information which undoubtedly will accumulate to clarify creativity in more detail. The intriguing prospect for explaining the creation of the universe is most plausible and needs to be accounted for in his model. The placing of creativity of man below the universe may be incorrect but this decision represents a bias. Man is herein considered as a by-product of the creation of the universe rather than vice-versa. It is conceivable that as the universe is explored other forms of man may be discovered which will establish man's place in the global creativity of man.

HOW TO EDUCATE A MAN

BY LOUIS WILLIAM NORRIS

I

WHENEVER A PANTY RAID COMES OFF, OR A NEW NEST OF PAID ATHLETES IS UNCOVERED, OR A FRATERNITY INITIATE IS KILLED ON SOME FREAKISH MISSION, THE CRY GOES UP: "What are the colleges coming to?" Curiously, this question is usually directed toward the education of men, not of women. Frequent reassessment of any major enterprise deserves our time. Since education constitutes in Locke's language "nine parts of ten" what a man is, his education frequently should be given a new scrutiny.

Further, the doubling in numbers of men expected to seek admission to college in the next ten years raises the sober question of whether the colleges are ready to give them what they as men most truly need. Should the education of men differ in any important regard from that of women, now that the latter have appropriated most of the areas of learning first blocked out for men?

Probably a definition of the education suited to a man cannot be any more acceptably established than one for love or democracy. A good place to begin, since some working conception remains inevitable, is with William James' belief that education consists in developing "the capacity to know a man when you see one." Whatever education may be, its focus embraces the quality of the man (or woman) which learning produces. The capacity to know a man does not guarantee that the knower is one that James would approve. It does reflect the fact that a standard of attainment has been formulated which deserves realization.

James probably meant the term "man" to be used in its generic sense. The fact that it didn't occur to him to say so reveals that education of a man nevertheless provided the unconscious model for his thought, as it has for the majority of most educators. The capacity to know a woman when you see one is in fact not the same thing as the capacity to know a man. Let James's statement stand, therefore, while we talk about the education of a man. It reflects the judgment by Princeton students of Woodrow Wilson when he was president of the university. Though the majority of them opposed him in the famous Quad controversy, whenever he appeared at a public meeting they roundly cheered him. A Princeton professor explained this by saying the students "know a man when they see one."

Education in these terms means discovery of the uncommon man, not cultivation of standards for knowing a "common man" when you see one. It takes little education to identify the latter type. To take the average citizen of a democracy, or the worker, or peasant from some other society, as the model which education seeks to release, abdicates the educator's task. Indeed, much public education threatens to do just that. To make education conform to the popular demand of any society causes it to reflect the defects, as well as virtues, of that society. Education, when looked upon as a "science," inclines to take the recurring standards of society as its criterion of excellence. What is needed here rather is a philosophy of education to prescribe the course of education.

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It is what man can become, not what he usually is, that is meant by this phrase. Aristotle insisted that the nature of a thing consists in its highest manifestation. All forms of things are tending toward their fullest actualization. In man, this forward-surging tendency comprises the *entelechie*, or intellect. The task of education, therefore, lies in establishing what a man can become at his highest potential. It involves the processes which operate when a man functions at his highest level. The focus of education lies, then, toward the peaks of actualization which a man may reach, rather than the points of contact he holds in common with his fellows. Not all growth of a man will be taken as good. It may be considered good only if it means progress toward realization of the greatest humanity in man. Hamlet's exclamation, "What a piece of work is a man," may call forth an affirmative reply, provided that a man considers success to lie in appropriation of his own talents, not matching those of others.

A college man is subsidized by his family, the college, or by the taxpayer, to provide leisure in which the earliest possible maturity of his powers may occur. It is a time for the perfection of every excellence in himself a man can discover, or plan in future to acquire. College education for social acceptance, good citizenship, adjustment to technological civilization, and other commonly asserted purposes, remains secondary and incidental. It is good for a man, and that's justification enough. Moreover, it is better for him, on the average, than his unguided search for these powers alone. To test himself under the penetrating gaze of experts is to save himself many an unproductive hour of mere trial-and-error.

II

Education of a man should be so structured, therefore, as to perfect the diverse potentials of his manliness.

To do this, a man's education must, first of all, open up to him all possibilities of growth and change of which he may be capable. A man needs to know what he can become, how he can change his life, what nature can do for and to him, how other men may assist or control him, and what even may be the outcome of his earthly existence, before he can make much progress in his education. A mind may be dull, "cabin'd, cribbed, and confined," because it does not realize its possibilities.

Here the arts perform a noble function. The phrase "liberal arts" comprises no polite anachronism. The arts liberate the powers of a man by activating his capacity, even though vicariously, for exploration and novelty. They probe the possibility of remodeling nature, setting up the realm of make-believe, so that the true world of experience can receive illuminating commentary. Mythology, for example, holds up the possibilities of human frailty and success in symbolism, often of horizon-opening proportions. Who can take the refinements of modern culture at face value, or overlook the resourcefulness of man possible when dealing with nature bare-handedly, after meeting Robinson Crusoe? Oedipus has come to typify the tragedy of failure in recognition, and Samson the certainty that dissipation will destroy the strong man.

A "Thinker" by Rodin, showing the stir in man when he reflects on those who pass through the gates of Hell, may dig deep in the recesses of an educating man and lead him to want more of sculpture. Marc's "Blue Horses" do violence

to color, but they show far more possibilities about the strength and action of horses than a man would ever see in an actual paddock or pasture. Suppose an "Ode to the West Wind" speaks to an imaginary spirit and invokes a reply. It makes a man alive to his world in a way he'll never give up again. If *Paradise Lost* succeeds in "justifying the ways of God to man," it shows man too that there are other concerns in the world to satisfy than his. The unexpected shades of life portrayed in humor surprise a man too with qualities he commonly overlooks. Bottom, guzzling his way through *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, reveals unforgettably the absurdities that follow careless morals.

Theology stretches the human spirit toward possibilities beyond the ranges of bodily life, and eventually toward a realm beyond the grave. The significance of man's dependence upon a power greater than himself for the things that matter most constitutes an area deserving of thorough exploration. Mystery beyond the range of reason, which is awesome yet fascinating and cannot be let alone, as Rudolf Otto held, lures every thoughtful man. What lies beyond the cutting edge of human thought has the effect of moving back the boundaries of reason as the thinker probes. Whether a college education includes theology by name or not matters little. But the province of inquiry it designates stands central in the plumbing of possibility which a mind must engage in.

Practically any subject a man investigates helps him find out something about what he can become. In this sense, he is exploring possibilities all the time. But a systematic exploration of what *any* man, i.e. mankind, may become, belongs to the preliminary stage of learning. The arts and religion or theology provide a sketch of potentials which a man may legitimately seek to make actual. This feature of education remains part of the structure with which learning begins and to which it must return over and over.

A second factor in the structure of education lies in its effort to identify the cosmic and universal frame of reference in which man seeks to become a man. Historically, of course, the arts developed before the sciences. It may be argued that a reverse order should characterize a man's education. But it can be as cogently asserted that a man does better to survey all realms of possibility in nature, man, and supernature, before he attempts to establish what the actual world is with which he must deal. Actually the two pursuits fructify each other, and probably should be carried on simultaneously. The essential is that the student get around to a thorough inventory *de rerum natura* as early in his intellectual history as he can.

Physical sciences report the elements of nature as they are, the laws that describe their behavior, and some of the possibilities for their revision and control. Here possibility overlaps actuality. The present eminence of these sciences carries threats as well as promises for the welfare of man. Any inclination to declare a moratorium on them can only mean that man is willing to leave unknown what he could know, and to leave unaccepted major responsibility for what he knows. The biological sciences with their concern for cell division and growth have so completely opened up this part of nature as to give credence for many to the idea that the whole universe is an organism in process of growth and evolution. Two world wars, a few depressions, and some barren art and literature, however, have led to a more sober belief that evolution is an hypothesis more fruitful in the animal and physical levels of nature than in the human. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the world is understandable, and not ruled by caprice,

remains the greatest contribution of science to civilization, as Bridgman and others have pointed out. The educating man must make the acquaintance of as large a part of nature's framework as time will allow.

Systematic observation and description of nature under given circumstances, the minimum function of science, invokes principles and hypotheses about what must be so, though not actually observed. Some scientists, and many of their lay admirers, believe they find out only the "facts" about nature. But these "facts" are usually found and used in a whole net of interpretation and evaluation. The scientist characteristically mixes metaphysics with his work, however he may disclaim it. The popular vogue of science might not be so great if it were commonly noticed that principles are invariably bootlegged into the background of fact. There is no such thing as completely empirical science.

This situation means that education must fill in the gaps *between* what is observed of nature's framework, and provide a pattern or interpretation *beyond* what is observed. The good scientist, who is also a philosopher, does this. Hence, the student has no choice. From what is observed to be so, inference may, and in fact must, be drawn to what *must* be so, though not observed. Electrons, chromosomes, memory, are not observable, but they must be so. Likewise, order, growth, rationality, value, exist though not visible to the senses. Standards of measurement, symbols of axiomatic worth, a totality of some kind in which the particles of experience occur, must unavoidably be inferred. The naturalist, positivist, and idealist alike confess the mystery of nature beyond man's grasp. Each makes some implicit or explicit, vague or clear, conscious or unconscious, hypothesis about this *aeternitatis* to which each human fact is *sub specie*. The frame of things the student seeks will be, in other words, both observed and inferred. He must become both a scientist and a philosopher.

Third, the structure of education provides a report on the sum total of recoverable human experience for its vicarious and actual reliving. Life is short, even at three score years and ten. Its enrichment comes from reading and living vicariously the lives of those who have gone before. This is why William A. Neilson, long president of Smith, said, "With books and imagination you can extend yourself for centuries and leagues." It is why William James held that all history should be taught as biographical history. One man can pour into his own life the experience of thousands about whom he has read. The inspired, tragic, banal, or humorous moments in a man's life need the context of similar experiences of others. Otherwise, his naivetè and juvenility persist, and he comes to the end of life with only a few of the nuggets experience might have refined for him.

Much in past experience manifestly cannot be considered worth reliving. Yet, some re-enactment of even these moments, at least in imagination, will be necessary in order to determine what henceforth to ignore. The function of the teacher consists in his helping the student sample the periods and people in history whose experience he needs to examine. A slavish admiration of experience in others hinders progress and cultivates either an eclectic personality, or one not at home in its own age. The ancestor worship once common in Asia and typical of the fast vanishing royal houses of Europe, and now of the D. A. R., as well as the belief of some classicists that only the Greeks were wise, ties a man to his past. Man's past experiences may be fruit to be eaten, or just sniffed and admired, or sometimes only thrown to the hogs.

History and literature enable a man to do a giant's job, since he sits on the shoulders of the past. But he must devise, too, principles for regulating his life with others who are doing the same. The social sciences are to a large degree statistical and therefore descriptive of human relations. But their real value lies in the facility they provide for transferring a human relation from one set of circumstances to another. They supply once more a vicarious assurance that one human relation may constitute a sample of all others like it. Some social laws characterize all groups without their planning; some are devised consciously for human improvement. The educated man must learn which laws he must abide by and can ignore only at his own peril, and which he can improve, or where new ones altogether are needed.

This necessity for choosing the experience a man wishes to import into his own life, and the requirement that he select those principles of social coordination which enrich himself and his fellows most fully, thrust on the learner the task of devising a scheme of values as a criterion for such selection. The student goes to his work with a philosophy of history lurking in his mind. He vaguely feels that his own history and that of his time should be better than those which have gone before. Let him grasp the inevitability of this circumstance and become as articulate here as elsewhere. This need points out the final feature in the structure of education.

Fourth, the structure of education calls for the intellectual articulation of a scheme of values and some exercise in their use. In no study is complete objectivity possible. The relations between mathematical symbols, or chemical elements, obtain whether they are considered good, bad, or indifferent, no doubt. Yet the fact that they *are* considered good, bad, or indifferent, and that the grasp of them will be sought for some reason, reveals that values are hopelessly interwoven with them. Every student and professor relies on a scheme of values. His only choice is one that is growing and defensible.

Axiology, the study of values, should be as central in all education as values themselves are central in the areas studied. The whole college community needs to see that these widely found values are theoretically examined and practically sought. Every professor should attend, for example, to the logic of the student. Explicit instruction in principles of reasoning, scrupulous care in use of terms and relations, the fair association of premises before conclusions, belong inherently to a college education. Further, every student needs some instruction in his duties to himself, his teachers, associates, family, and the total community. A knowledge of right, wrong, and good seldom comes in satisfactory dimensions from his family. Nor is it absorbed magically from the "atmosphere" of rectitude left on a campus by the college founders. It comes from as rigorous slogging away at the problem of conduct as at the problems of valence, subjunctive mood, or marginal utility.

As for aesthetic value, the college must seek to soften even the most unregenerated ruffian. If he can muster no more than a melodious whistle, or appreciation for a beautiful tackle on the gridiron, at first, he can and must be shown that a thing of beauty, and perhaps even of ugliness, can be a joy forever. Again, the adequate college recognizes the validity of religious outcomes. If Whitehead be right, as many believe, education cultivates eventually the spirit of religion. It inspires reverence before so great possibilities of good set before a man, and

inculcates duty because of such responsibility and freedom left in his hand to complete or fumble the course of things.

Without seeking indoctrination, the college offering the most complete education will look well to the duty of inculcating a noble scheme of values. Much has been made of this generation's insecurity. Such a pathological condition will not be removed by frantic search for a more "practical" course to aid adjustment, by counseling, or by early marriage. The long-range investment of time and energy, and preparation to pay costs in weariness, pain, and important failures, will come only from a man who knows where he is going, and why. He will not be frustrated by failure or afflicted by feelings of inferiority for he knows there is a scheme of things and he belongs in it. Locke put "virtue" ahead of "wisdom," "good breeding," and "learning" in his aims of education. He believed that, whatever education accomplished, it should direct a man to the "best." Plato's belief that a man's steadfast pursuit of ideas will eventually lead him to "the good," offers the clue that all learning must come to a scheme of values in which ideas provide the structure.

A church-related college rests on a Christian scheme of values. The college departs from its function as an educational institution if it seeks to impose this scheme as a ready-made pattern upon its students. However profound the scheme of St. Thomas may have been, or however comprehensive and penetrating a faculty committee's Christian platform may be, it cannot be thrust on a student for his slavish adoption. The Christian hierarchy of goods allows many interpretations and applications. It may not end in the same semantic robes, when established in the kingdom of a modern student's mind, as it had in the mind of his teacher. But the main concern should be that a student's thought confront a Christian conception of meaning and value in things, when followed to its implications. Such a conclusion will commend itself when made clear and set in the full context of its alternatives.

Students and colleges vary in their attention to these factors in the structure of education. The aesthete and the professional art school are interested almost entirely in the possibilities in things. A technician and the technological school (though less so in recent years) are occupied with the framework of nature. Classicists and schools living on "the great books" concentrate on recovery of the past. The overly pious student counts a man's scheme of values as the only thing that matters, and his fundamentalist college is likely to short-change him in concern for the other legitimate phases of education's structure. Evidently a thorough education must include comparable attention to each of these four basic themes.

III

Such a program reveals that the structure of education has a basic unity. The college with completely free election of studies has been a mistake. Its concession that only the entering freshman knows what he ought to study abdicates one of the basic functions of the faculty. A faculty of experts who have not found from their own studies what matters most, confesses a pusillanimousness beyond expression. It is sometimes remarked that this is the first generation of parents that is afraid of its children. Let educators not be guilty of the same superficiality!

Colleges must provide the educating man with what Woodrow Wilson called "guided education," that is, "a scheme of related subjects." He pointed out in his inaugural address at Princeton that the college must "supply the synthesis." He decried the "separate baronies of knowledge" that permit vast ignorance in between. Guided education consists in adequate orientation within each of the four features of learning outlined above. This does not mean a "survey" of each will do. A man must develop some competence in each. If he can come out of college qualified in some respectable degree as artist, scientist, historian, and philosopher, one need not worry about his future studies, no matter how narrow.

Does any one of these studies provide the principle of unity for all the rest? Probably axiology, or value studies, comes nearest, since the above analysis of education's structure represents, in a sense, a scheme of values itself. To make valuation and its laws the principle of unity would be better than reestablishing theology as "the queen of the sciences." The latter deals primarily with only one of the values, namely religion, and it involves a metaphysics which education should explore, not assume. But the four disciplines of learning represent "the round whole of knowledge." What better principle of unity is there? This plan contains "the discipline of reflective synthesis," which Henry Wriston takes to be the highest obligation of education.

Whatever group of studies a student selects, it must grow out of this structure in education. What Theodore Green calls "the texture," or individuality of a student's mind, should reflect some such basic structure in his learning. There may be subsidiary unities in narrower fields where the student works, but let them not substitute for the larger intellectual design of a total education. Huxley commented that the German universities, at the turn of the century, had room for "all forms of intellectual activity." Such varied activity should characterize an educational institution, provided only that this multiversity be undergirded by "the round whole" of learning, which makes its program that of a university.

Education in these terms differs from mere training. It is primarily an intellectual enterprise, and not only a perfecting of manual, visual, or emotional skills. College needs to be primarily a period for cultivating the intellect because the unfolding of personality depends upon the character and growth of the mind. Since the mind is man's peculiar possession, he should make the most of it. In fact, his most lasting satisfactions come from his use of it. There is little danger of the modern college man becoming overly intellectual, since he has usually been so unaccustomed to a life of that sort in high school. Not all parts of life are of equal importance. Concern about food, clothing, health, business, family life, follow from the use a man makes of his mind. It is an unenlightened generation that excuses its unwillingness to face the rigors of reason by labeling the man of reason an "egg-head."

This means that education is universal in its bearing. Training is individual and specific. Jaques Barzun has affirmed that "a principle is the only thing worth teaching anybody." Thus, education should be concerned with factors applicable to as great a variety of circumstances as possible. Training is usually addressed to a particular job, and it should, therefore, come after education. Theodore Greene concludes that the real function of education, that is, the answer to the question of what and how to teach, is "discipline." By the basic disciplines he means the general skills adaptable to a variety of situations. Linguistic pro-

ficiency, discovery of facts, and techniques for evaluation and interpretation, are the essence of education. The particular skills usually acquired in "training" may limit future experience by preempting time and attention. They may pass out of date. Education should keep the mind up-to-date, and enable it to change its line of march in learning without losing momentum.

Training develops skills that are private and not easily transferable. Education concerns communicable knowledge and methodology. It is the common property of differing minds, though its texture may be unique with each mind. An educated man is one who stands in a meaningful relation, that is, in a communicating bond with himself, other men, nature, and God. As education progresses, the more significant these lines of communication become. Communication involves articulation, a basically intellectual process. Let it not be said that education has "so little for the mind," that it can only vaguely feel its world but never deal intelligently with it. Hilda Neatby finds sadly that this latter condition characterizes the educational climate of Canada. Education deals in the common coin of communication.

Education must have, to be sure, an expected vocational outcome. In a democratic society, social parasitism becomes less and less possible, and certainly more and more disapproved. A man must expect to acquire some wealth, or in any case to manage wisely what is given him. He must at least learn to live meaningfully in an industrial society. He may gather from his education as it progresses qualities which will advance him in his chosen work. But he must delay a full occupation with the demands of his work until he has appropriated the fourfold structure of education. Education comprises a lifetime venture and must never end. Yet, its structure should be embraced as fully and as early in life as a man can arrange it. He will then be able to have his job work for him and not the reverse. Only then can Carlyle's ideal for a man be realized, namely, that he needs no other blessedness than his work.

IV

Education for a man differs in some respects from that of a woman. It differs clearly, in the first place, in its appropriation of experience in the past which a man wishes to emulate or reject. Leadership in the state and in the market place has come to a large extent from men. The same is true of the church, at least so far as the records go. A man will inevitably study his task by examining the achievements of his forebearers who were men. He will need to know how the women affected the success of these men, to be sure. But he is more fortunate than women in the materials at his hand, for most history has been written about men. Literature comes nearer perhaps to elaborating equally on the lives of both men and women.

If an important part of education is a vicarious reliving of pertinent moments in the past, women can gain but modest profit from a vicarious living of the lives of men, or of women who uniformly occupied a position inferior to that of men. The creative fashioning of women's role in a society of equals has been a phenomenon largely of the twentieth century. Men can expect more help from their historical studies than women, when it comes to refining experience that augments today's tasks. This does not mean men should study history, but women should not. It is, however, conceivable that history should be taught to the two sexes

in somewhat different ways. History should not teach women to be spectators of men's exploits merely, but, alas, that is how it often has been done.

A second difference in the education of a man from that of a woman lies in the certainty and immediacy of vocational life it assumes. The certainty of a man's adding a vocational plan to his education remains inevitable, as pointed out above. This is not true for women. The wisdom of their having a vocational plan to put into operation at some time in their life, should marriage not be desired, be prevented, be interrupted, or prove economically and psychically insufficient, all would of course recognize. A woman needs to be ready to readjust her line of march on short notice. She needs to know "how to do something," but she can rarely be as sure as a man when or where that will be.

Women need to embrace the four themes in the structure of education as much as do the men. But the division of labor prevalent in most circles calls upon them to emphasize more fully the first and fourth, possibility and valuation. They commonly foster the arts more fully than men, and their articulation of the scheme of values in their time involves a larger use of their talents than the sciences, pure or applied. All the realms of learning are open to women now, and nearly every vocation that capitalizes on any particular realm of knowledge or skill permits their entry. But they probably will never excel in some fields. A woman will do better to seek her unique contributions to her generation, than to demand of herself that she match the attainments of men with similar ones. All this means that courses in economics could have a different flavor for women, at least that their application and illustrative materials should be different from those for men. A man who digs deep in the sciences and in history will doubtless find himself moving more directly into his vocation and with more usable equipment than the average woman.

A third difference in the education of men lies in the place occupied by the arts of homemaking and child care. Home decoration and management need to be understood by men, but responsibility for them is bound to fall primarily to the women. Most of the factors which make a culturally creative home are doubtless found in the broader ranges of learning outside a study of the home itself. In this way a man and his wife bring to their home qualities garnered from a great variety of subjects studied. Nevertheless, the explicit amalgamation of these factors, plus attention to the specific problems of a man's particular home, rest naturally with the lady of the house.

Child care is a man's business as well as his wife's. But the mother spends more time with the children and is more likely to be on hand in times of crisis. Thus, the psychology of children, their education in its earliest stages, requires a competence in women which men rarely are called upon to muster. All men are educators of children in some sense, but this function will probably be exercised at a distance more commonly by men than women. Education for parenthood is certainly not beneath a man. But he cannot study everything in college. He can rely on help in this area more surely than in areas where the family's source of livelihood is concerned.

Again, a man's education differs from a woman's in the responsibility it imposes for assisting the companion sex to realize its fullest possibilities. Since the status of men has long been, at least to World War I, one of dominance, this

need not devolve so clearly on women. A woman, of course, needs always to consider her duty to help others express their deepest powers. Especially is this true in relation to her husband. Yet, men have the advantage of tradition and a natural aggressiveness which have long made their way. If a woman must fight too vigorously for her opportunities, she may become resentful, mannish, or frustrated. The better part of valor, nay, the wisdom of economy in effort, requires a man to work for such conditions as permit women full use of their powers.

Let a man's study of history and literature, his search of experience he may recover vicariously, lead him to recognize the undeveloped potential for creative arts, economic production, political leadership, and religious nourishment, that women have so long represented. No mere chivalry nor spirit of condescension need be suspected here. The accomplishments of women in the last thirty-five years in these areas have surpassed advances made by them in the preceding thirty-five hundred years. One need be no crusader for women's rights to see that the cultural life of a man's future will be profoundly affected by this development. Let his education prepare him for effective participation in this new age.

V

Education for a man, when conceived in these terms, is both useful and practical.

First of all, such an education is useful to the man himself who pursues it. Nothing is more practical than learning how to think, as well as how to appropriate the best thoughts of others. There is a spontaneous satisfaction about the mind's exercise of its powers which a purely utilitarian view of education overlooks. To demand of education that it "be good for something" makes of it work instead of the sheer enjoyment it can be in itself. A mind that knows how to handle itself becomes a self-perpetuating source of joy that guarantees ever new experience and accomplishment. It rings true the observation of Timothy Dwight that "the happiest person is the person who thinks the most interesting thoughts." No higher tribute was ever given a teacher than Howard R. Patch gave William A. Neilson when the latter was a teacher of English at Harvard. "He had the power to reveal," said Patch, "the fun of the intellectual life."

Secondly, such an education will be useful to a variety of social institutions. Woodrow Wilson revealed the bias of his studies in political science by asserting that education is primarily "a kind of minor statesmanship," "a service to the nation." It is that, but much more. Education fulfills not merely political values, but those borne by other institutions as well. All institutions are the lengthened shadow of all the men (and women) who participate in them. They in turn augment the lives of those who participate in them. Edgar Dale's observation that "The strongest protection of any nation is thinking," would apply to the church, the family, business, or practically any other type of institution. The healthy functioning of all institutions does, of course, compose the health of the most inclusive institution, which is indeed the nation. But a man who has tested for himself the possibilities through the arts, examined the world as it is, drawn from recoverable experience such instruction as will broaden and deepen his life, and who forges a scheme of values that will stand the strains of cynicism and failure, will count in every group to which he belongs.

This means, in the third place, that the educated man will be a servant of his generation and hence a guide to history. Progress consists in making it possible for a larger and larger number of people to find their talents used and expressed creatively. The educated man has found the self-rewarding joy of expressing his powers. In making such enjoyment the privilege of others, he advances the cause of civilization. Such participation in the creative artistry of mankind does not leave history to a necessitarian course, but guides it by a criterion of values. The joy of self-expression that is socially useful has no higher criterion to meet, for there is none, except that this "usefulness" harmonize with a cosmic scheme of things, the Christian's will of God.

Such usefulness in its fullest sense will be the privilege of only the minority. "Education for democracy" often overlooks the leadership by a few, which even democracy welcomes. All believers in democracy thrilled at the Churchillian epigram that "never have so many owed so much to so few." It expressed the inevitability of an artistocracy of talent leading the way of democracy. A kind of voluntary artistocracy which considers equality of consideration, and not ability, to be the rule, can scarcely be avoided. Freedom must mean privilege of expression for one's individual natural gifts, not uniformity of opportunity. There is "a diversity of gifts, but the same spirit." The American college must be saturated with sympathies for the common man, but it should not seek to produce him.

A people "bent upon the errands of the mind" will educate as many of its men in college as it can. It will prepare for an unknown future with confidence, for its leaders will be equipped with knowledge of what has been the experience of man, and with reasonable principles of what it should yet become. At the vanguard of its advance will be an educated man, who, like Cromwell's best soldier, "knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows." If he fails, he will do it intelligently, and rising, he will only fight better!

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the inclusive and pervasive satisfaction we get is the sense of accomplishment, the satisfaction of doing what we are cut out to do, the feeling of fulfilling our natures in a creative way. For we are by nature makers, as Aristotle said, and our generic value is to make and to be made, to re-make and to be re-made.

However, the creative impulse is only a direction and a disposition. It does not have an explicit and positive voice of its own; but it does have the power, like Socrates' daemon, to warn us when all is not well (if we will but listen) and when a course of feeling or thought is not befitting to our natures or to our condition of life. And it has moreover the capacity to ratify what is right and concordant with our characters and development. Yet in the domain of what is characteristically human it must exercise its reign through the hearts and minds and hands and tongues of its ministers—the conscious reason and the responsive affects. And these agents if willing and able may serve and extend it in ways it never dreamed of as it slumbered inarticulate and undeveloped in the infancy of mankind as well as in the infinitely varied and remote forms of organic and cosmic evolution.

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